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SUMMARY:

This case invovles an across-the-board

challenge to the Pennsylvania "Abortion Control" statute.

The

CA3 held that several of the provisions of this statute were

unconstitutional on their face; the State appeals from some of

- - - -- -

these determinations.
2.

FACTS AND DECISION BELOW:

comprehensive

At issue is Pennsylvania's

"Abortion Control Act" which was due to go into

effect in December 1982.

About a month prior to its effective

date appellees brought this §1983 action for declaratory and
injunctive relief, claiming that many of the provisions in the
Act were unconstitutional on their face, and urging that the
Act be stricken in its entirety.

The TC refused to grant a

preliminary injunction, except with respect to the requirement
that a woman wait 24 hours after discussing the abortion with
her doctor before proceeding.

Appees immediately appealed;

the CA3 stayed enforcement of the Act pending resolution of
the appeal, and then after full

argument~eld

the case pending

resolution of this Court's decisions in Planned Parenthood
Assn. of Kansas City v. Ashcroft, 103 S.Ct. 2517 (1983}, and
City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 103
S.Ct. 2481 (1983}.

---------------

---

After reargument and full briefing, the

-

CA3 upheld several challenged sections of the
-~

-

--·~--

-----

tatute, and

also struck down numerous provisions as facially

". -

~

· · ---=---- -~-------.............

unconstitutional.

--

~-------

-··-____.../

The CA3 first addressed the question of its scope of
review.

Although noting that ordinarily the denial of a

preliminary injunction will be reviewed only for abuse of
discretion, the CA3 found that due to the delays in this case
it had a well-developed factual and legal record, and

concluded that under the circumstances the TC's discretion
"yields to our plenary scope of review as to applicable law."
For the sake of clarity, it is perhaps best to discuss
each statutory provision separately.

Only the State has

appealed at present, and it has not argued that the CA3 was
wrong as to each section declared unconstitutional, but only
as to five in particular.

I note at the outset my belief that

the CA3's decisions in striking down at least two of the
provisions are sufficiently questionable, and pose
sufficiently novel questions, to warrant this Court's noting
probable jurisdiction.

Unfortunately, appellants'

jurisdictional statement is not subject to being broken down
question by question.

On the other hand, I expect that this

Court is not thrilled about taking a whole series of abortion
questions once again, particularly when some of the questions
are very similar to those presented in City of Akron and
Ashcroft.
(1)

Reporting: Sections 3214(a) ,(b), and (h) require the

attending physician to sign a report on every abortion,
regardless of trimester.

This report would include 14

categories of data, including but not limited to
identification of the physician, the facility, and the
referring physician, agency or service; the political
subdivision and state in which the woman resides; her age,
race and marital status, the number of her prior pregnancies;
the date of her last menstrual period and the probable
gestational age of the unborn child; the type of procedure

- 4 performed; complications; the length and weight of the aborted
unborn child when measurable; the "basis for any medical
judgment that a medical emergency existed," and a viability
report.

The report does not include the woman's name or

address.
The CA3 struck these sections down on the ground that the
nature and complexity of these reporting requirements were
likely to have a significant impact on the woman's abortion
decision.

The CA3 noted that this Court had upheld "general

recordkeeping requirements" in Planned Parenthood of Central
Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 80, but reasoned that in
this statute the reports were being utilized to accomplish a
restriction through their sheer burden.

The court also

reasoned that the reporting requirements would increase the
cost of abortions, and that the State was required to proffer
compelling state interests to justify the detail required.
Judge Seitz dissented.

He stated that "I do not regard

these reports as having a legally significant impact on the
abortion decision."

He failed to see how the record keeping

requirements were more or less than those permitted in
Danforth, since in Danforth the Court merely noted that the
requirements were "general."

These records were "reasonably

directed to the preservation of maternal health," and the
majority had gone way out of its way when it suggested that
the reporting requirements are unconstitutional because they
will increase the costs of an abortion.

In Ashcroft, the

Court approved a required pathologist's examination for each

abortion.

That exam cost $19; there is nothing in the record

to suggest that the added burden from the record requirements
here would approach the $19 allowed in Ashcroft • .
(2) Informed Consent:

Section 3205(a) (1) of the statute

requires that each woman considering abortion be informed by
her physician or physician's helper, inter alia, of the
phsician's name, "the fact that there may be detrimental
physical and psychological effects which are not accurately
forseeable," and "the probable gestational age of the unborn
child at the time the abortion is to be performed."

Section

(a) (2) requires in addition that the woman be informed of "the
fact that medical assistance benefits may be available for
prenatal care, child birth and neonatal care"; "the fact that
the father is liable to assist in support of her child, even
in instances where the father has offered to pay for the
abortion"; and the fact that the woman has a right (but is not
required) to review certain printed materials.

Those

materials are described in §3208 and include "geographically
indexed materials designed to inform the woman of public and
private agencies and services available to assist a woman
through pregnancy, upon childbirth and while the child is
dependent, including adoption agencies; a statement that "the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania strongly urges you to contact
[these agencies] before making a final decision about

I

I
I
\

abortion"; and "materials designed to inform the woman of the
probably anatomical and physiological characteristics of the
unborn child at two-week gestational periods commencing from

- 6 -

fertilization to full term, including relevant information on
the possibility of the unborn child's survival."
The CA3 found that this information paralleled a similar
informational section that was struck down in City of Akron.
The court invoked similar concerns--the need to give the
attending physician the room he needs to make his best medical
judgment, and the requirement that the State avoid regulations
designed to influence the woman's informed choice--and held
this section unconstitutional also.

The information here is

designed not to inform of the woman's consent but "rather to
persuade her to withhold it altogether."

Akron reaffirmed

that the physician should not be required to give a litany of
information, but must be allowed to tailor his information to
a given patient.

Here some of the information--i.e., the name

of the physician--was certainly objectionable, and any
information that might not be objectionable could not be
severed.
Judge Seitz dissented with respect to §(a) (2).

He

believed that the government had conceded the
unconstitutionality of §(a) (1), requiring disclosure of the
physician's name.

He believed, however, that much of the

information required in §(a) (2) was specifically held in Akron
to be "not objectionable."

103 S.Ct., at 2501 n. 37.

Unlike

the statute struck down in Akron, this information can be
given by a non-physician counselor, "so the objection the
Supreme Court had for the Akron statute does not apply here."

The majority had completely misread Akron in holding to the
contrary.
(3) Parental Consent:

§3206 of the Act requires

unemancipated minors to obtain the consent of their parents,
or a court order, before an abortion can be performed.

The

CA3, although rejecting challenges to this section on equal
protection and due process grounds and refusing to hold the
section unconstitutional on its face, enjoined enforcement of
this section pending promulgation of rules by the Pennsylvania
Sup. Ct. that would ensure "confidentiality and dispatch."
The court so held despite §3206(f): "[c]ourt proceedings under
this section shall be confidential and shall be given such
precedence over other pending matters as will insure that the
court will reach a decision promptly and without delay in
order to serve the best interests of the pregnant woman, but
?

in no case shall the court fail to rule within ' business days

"

of the date of application."

(4) Second Physician Requirement: §3210 of the Act makes
it a felony for a physician to perform certain abortions
during the third trimester.

§3210(c) requires any physician

performing an abortion which does not preclude the possibility
of the child surviving to arrange for the attendance of a
second physician.

The second physician will be in charge of

the health of the child.

Intentional violation of this

provision constitutes a felony.

The provision does not

contain an exception for situations where the abortion is
performed during emergencies and there may not be time to

----------------------------------

- 8 obtain the attendance of a second physician; however,
§3210(a), which makes it a felony to perform an abortion of a
viable fetus, provides a "complete defense" for an abortion
"necessary to preserve maternal life or health."
The CA3 struck down §3210(c) because it did not provide
an exception to the second physician requirement for emergency
situations.

Judge Seitz dissented.

He noted that this court

discussed a very similar statute in Ashcroft, 103 S.Ct., at
2522 and n. 8.

There the Court construed another clause of

the state statute to apply an exception for emergency
situations.
(5) Regulations Encouraging a Live Birth:

§3210(b) of

the Act requires a physician performing an abortion on a
viable fetus to use the abortion method most likely to produce
a live birth, unless that method "would produce a
significantly greater medical risk to the life or health of
the pregnant woman."

The CA3 struck down this provision on

the ground that this Court has said on prior occasions that
the State's interest in a live birth is subordinated where
procedures encouraging such a live birth will pose any greater
health risk to the mother.

Here the CA3 focused on the word

"significantly," noting that the statute apparently would
require the use of methods encouraging live births even where
there was a cognizable greater possibility of adverse health

I

I
I
r

effects on the mother.
decision.

Judge Seitz concurred in this

See Colautti v. Franklin, 439

u.s.

379, 400 (1979).

- 9 -

3.

CONTENTIONS:

contentions first.

I will dispose of some preliminary

Appts argue that the CA3 exceeded the

scope of its appellate review of a decision to deny a
preliminary injunction by holding these provisions facially
unconstitutional.

Appts contend that ordinarily the scope of

review of a denial of a preliminary injunction is whether or
not the lower court abused its discretion; such a
determination is based on the likelihood of success on the
merits and a balancing of the equities; this Court has
squarely held that an appeals court cannot declare a statute
unconstitutional when examining a preliminary injunction
motion.

See Mayo v. Lakeland Highlands Canning Co., 309 U.S.

310, 316 (1940).
Appees respond in that any case where in ruling on a
preliminary injunction motion the record is clear enough so
that the appeals' court can enter a final judgment, it is in
the interest of judicial economy for it to do so.

Here, in

light of Akron and Ashcroft, the record was clear enough that
several of the provisions must be unconstitutional.
Appees also argue that this Court does not have appellate
jurisdiction because the decision below is not sufficiently
"final."

Although 28 U.S.C. §1254(2), unlike §1257 governing

review of state court decisions, does not contain an express
"finality" requirement, this Court has found such a
requirement in the past.
Co. v. Flemming, 351

u.s. 188 (1929)).

See South Carolina Electric & Gas

u.s. 901 (citing Slaker v. O'Conner, 278

I.

Appts reply that this Court has not read such a
limitation into the certiorari jurisdiction under §1254(1),
'

and more recent opinions have expressed doubt concerning
whether such finality is required for appeals under §1254(2).
See New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 301-302 (1976)
curiam)~

Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422

u.s.

(per

922, 927 (1975).

The contentions of the parties on the merits will be
dealt with in the discussion.
4.

DISCUSSION:

First, with respect to scope of review,
.,.,..

..-:-=

it appears that the CA3 may have jumped the gun, but unless

-----·-··

---......

this Court wants to take appellants' suggestion and summarily
reverse on this ground, resolution of this question can await
a decision on the merits.

Given the CA3's clear expression

its views in this case, it is hard to see what purpose a
summary reversal on this ground would serve.
Second, I also think that the question of our appellate
jurisdiction should be reserved for argument on the merits.
-...
-·- --·-- ----.....__,._---------~----Ther most recent opinions of this Court suggest that the

---··

question is unsettled, and even if a "finality" requirement
could be implied into §1254(2) it still would be open to
question whether exceptions similar to those in Cox
Broadcasting should also be inferred.

If so, this case might

nevertheless be sufficiently "final," given the lower court's
express resolution of the constitutional questions.
Turning to the merits:
(!)Reporting: Appts argue that Judge Seitz was correct.
These reports are necessary to compile the type of statistics

- 11 that this Court has reviewed in prior opinions on abortion.
They are reasonably related to preserving maternal health.
Appees add nothing to the CA3 discussion.
I think the CA3's decision on this section is highly

-------

questionable.

v

~

Such reporting was approved in Danforth

provided it was reasonably directed to the preservation of
maternal health.

In addition,

the pathologist's exam.

in~shcroft

this Court approved

It is reasonable to suspect that much

of the information required here would be relayed to any
pathologist undertaking one of those exams.

These regulations

do seem reasonably directed to the preservation of maternal
health, and this Court has not spoken in any detail on this

_____..

area, although its discussion in Danforth indicates some kind
of fact-based inquiry into the burdens imposed.

I recommend

the Court note probable jurisdiction at least with respect to
this issue.
(2)Informed Consent:

In addition to Judge Seitz'

arguments, appts argue that much of the information concerning
possible effects of an abortion, contained in §3205 (a) (1), is
I

constitutional.

They contend that that section can be

distinguished from the

"p~rade

of horribles" required by the

Akron statute.
Appees argue that the requirement of giving the

I
I
I
I

~

information, viewing the information as a whole, interferes
with the phisicians ability to treat each patient
individually.

- 12 This decision is also highly questionable.

Judge Seitz

is quite right that most of the information required in
§(a} (2} was noted to be "not objectionable" in Akron footnote
~

37.

The printed information o~ was not even required to

be given, but the court struck that section down anyway.

In

addition, some of the information required by §(a} (1} seems
quite reasonable: the state should be able to require certain
basic medical information to be given to each patient:
certainly it can do so as the result of a malpractice action.
The information here is not the "parade of horribles" of the
Akron statute.

The Court should note probable jurisdiction on

this section also.
(3}Parental Consent:

Appt contends the CA3 ignored this

Court's holdings in Ashcroft and Bellotti that the absence of
state court rules does not invalidate a minor consent statute,
and that in any event Pennsylvania's guidelines are not that
amorphous.

Appee urges that this Court does not have

appellate jurisdiction over this issue, because the CA3 did
not hold this section unconstitutional, but merely enjoined
its enforcement pending action by the state supreme court.
This decision is also questionable.

The statute would

'------

seem to satisfy this Court's prior decisions.
think we have appellate jurisdiction.

In addition, I

Although the court did

not hold the statute facially unconstitutional, if it did not
hold the statute unconstitutional in its present state it is
hard to see why it enjoined its enforcement.

This situation,

of course, would best have been dealt with through

- 13 certification to the state courts, if

avai~able,

or

abstention, but since those two words do not appear anywhere
in the papers I assume they were not raised by appt and are
not at issue here.
Since there are some issues that this Court probably will
take in this case, it may as well take this one also.
(4)Second Physician Requirement:

Appt says that this

section, construed in light of the exception in §3210(a) for
medical emergencies, is constitutional under the reasoning of
the majority in Ashcroft.
Again, this problem, because it involves a construction
of the relationship between two sections of a state statute,
would best have been solved through certification or
abstention, and without an authoritative state law decision
this issue is really up in the air.

It is not clear whether

the language of §3210(c) was intended to be qualified by the
language of §3210(a).

The Court may wish to address this

question merely to explain that certification or abstention
was the best course.
(S)Regulations Encouraging a Live Birth:

Appts state

that with respect to the requirement that methods for
preserving the life of a viable fetus be undertaken absent a
"substantial" effect on the mother's health, the TC construed
the statute to preserve its constitutionality, but the CA3
rejected this construction.

They argue that the CA3 should

have construed the statute to preserve its constitutionality.

- 14 I tend to think that this decision was correct.

Again,

appts apparently foreclosed the opportunity for an
authoritative state court construction.

This decision is a

candidate for summary affirmance, if the Court wishes to note
•

only on specific sections of the statute.
(5) Conclusion: In sum, I think the Court should reserve
any procedural or jurisdictional problems for argument.

I

th a t th e 1 ower court I s d ec1s1ons
• •
•
•
b e 1 1eve
on t h@
e report1ng
requirements and

t~nfor~d conse~
-------

requirements ar ; highly

questionable, and involve areas where this Court has not
spoken clearly e nough so that the decisions can be summarily
affirmed or reversed.

Since the Court probably should note

probable jurisdiction on those issues, it may wish to note
probable jurisdiction on the parental consent and second
~

physician requirements as well.
I recommend note probable jurisdiction .•
There is a response, and a reply.
December 3, 1984

Englander
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
RICHARD THORNBURGH ET AL. v. AMERICAN
COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND
GYNECOLOGISTS ET AL.

~OMFOR
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
THE THIRD CIRCUIT

~ - --

No. 84-495.

Decided January-, 1985

PER CURIAM.

~It;
~~

~

Appellants, seven State and local governmental officials
from Pennsylvania, have invoked this Court's jurisdiction
under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(2), 1 seeking review of a judgment of !r(~
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 2
rj_~
which directed the District Court to enter a preliminary injunction against enforcement of various provisions of Penn- ~~)
sylvania's 1982 Abortion Control Act, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat.
Ann. §§ 3201-3220 (Purdon 1983). Because the judgment of J~
the Court of Appeals is not final, it is not entirely clear that //7 _,_....., ~. ~ -d.. I
we have jurisdiction under § 1254(2). 3 Even assuming that / __,- -~
jurisdiction exists under§ 1254(2), however, in the particular ~ vi.-

/V41t-

1 Section 1254(2) provides:
{/
.
"Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by ~ /...the following methods:

(2) By appeal by a party relying on a State statute held by a court of
appeals to be invalid as repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of
the United States, but such appeal shall shall preclude review by writ of
certiorari at the instance of such appellant, and the review on appeal shall
be restricted to the Federal questions presented." 28 U. S. C. § 1254(2).
2
737 F. 2d 283 (1984) (appendix contains relevant sections of the Act).
8
See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 927 (1975); City of El
Paso v. Simmons, 379 U. S. 497, 501-503 (1965); South Carolina Electric
and Gas Co. v. Flemming, 351 U. S. 901, 901 (1956) (per curiam); Slaker
v. O'Connor, 278 U. S. 188, 189-190 (1929) (interpreting predecessor to
§ 1254(2)). But see New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U. S. 297, 301-302 (1976)
(per curiam); Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. 57"U:""S. 17, 82(1958).

f ··

2

THORNBURGH v. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OB. & GYN.

circumstances of this case the policies disfavoring piecemeal
appellate review and premature adjudication of constitutional
questions persuade us that the appeal should be dismissed.
See Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331
U. S. 549, 565-575 (1947); cf. Minnick v. California Department of Corrections, 452 U. S. 105, 127 (1981); New Orleans
v. Dukes, 427 U. S. 297, 302 (1976) (per curiam).
The Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act (the Act) was
signed by the Governor on June 11, 1982, and scheduled to
become effective on December 8, 1982. On October 2, 1982,
appellees, including various medical professionals and abortion providers, commenced this action in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania seeking to enjoin enforcement of the entire Act. On October 29,
1982, they filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. At
the request of the District Court and "solely for the purpose
of the motion for preliminary injunction,"• the parties
entered into a stipulation of uncontested facts. Relying primarily on the Court of Appeals decisions in Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 651 F. 2d 1.198
(CA6 1981), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 462 U. S. 416
(1983), and Planned Parenthood Association v. Ashcroft, 655
F. 2d 848 (CA8 1981), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 462
U. S. 476 (1983), the District Court concluded that, with one
exception, the appellees were not entitled to preliminary injunctive relief. See 552 F. Supp. 791 (ED Pa. 1982).
Appellees immediately appealed the denial of the preliminary injunction, and the appellants cross-appealed with respect to the one provision that the District Court had held
invalid. On December 9, 1982, the Court of Appeals granted
appellees' motion for a stay of enforcement of the entire Act
pending appeal. Mter oral argument, the Court of Appeals
decided to postpone its decision until after this Court decided
the Akron, Ashcroft, and Sirrwpoulos cases which were then
• 552 F. Supp. 791, 794 n. 1 (ED Pa. 1982).

THORNBURGH v. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OB. & GYN.

3

pending in this Court. 5 Following our decision in those
cases on June 15, 1983, the Court of Appeals ordered reargument and, on May 31, 1984, handed down its opinion.
737 F. 2d 283 (CA3 1984). The Court refused to hold the entire Act unconstitutional, 6 but held that certain provisions of
the Act were invalid in the light of our rulings in Akron,
Ashcroft, and Simopoulos, 1 and that the validity of other
provisions might be affected by evidence adduced at trial, 8 or
by the adoption of appropriate procedural rules by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 9
In their jurisdictional statement in this Court, the appellants ask us to hold that the Court of Appeals committed
procedural error by holding any portion of the Act unconstitutional upon review of an order entered on a motion for a
preliminary injunction. The appellants also contend that
some of the Court of Appeals' substantive rulings were
erroneous. 10
With respect to the asserted procedural error, we agree
that correct practice normally limits the scope of appellate
review of such orders to the question whether the District
6
City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462
U. S. 416 (1983); Planned Parenthood Association v. Ashcroft, 462 U. S.
476 (1983); Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U. S. 506 (1983).
8
737 F . 2d, at 292.
7
For example, the Court of Appeals held the 24-hour waiting period required by §§ 3205(a)(1) and (2) of the Act, and the hospital requirement in
§ 3209 invalid. 737 F. 2d, at 293.
8
See 737 F . 2d, at 299-300 (refusing to hold § 3210(a) invalid on its face
because of the inadequate record).
' See the discussion of § 3206, the parental or judicial consent requirement for minors. 737 F. 2d, at 296-297.
10
Two questions are presented in the jurisdictional statement:
"1. Whether a court of appeals properly may declare provisions of state
law unconstitutional on appeal from a district court's disposition of a motion
for preliminary injunction.
''2. Whether the court of appeals misapplied the precedents of this Court
in declaring unconstitutional numerous provisions of Pennsylvania's Abortion Control Act." Juris. Statement i.

THORNBURGH v. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OB. & GYN.

4

Court abused its discretion in deciding that there was, or was
not, irreparable harm and a probability that the plaintiffs
would succeed on the merits. See Doran v. Salem Inn,
Inc., 422 U. S. 922, 931-932 (1975); Mayo v. Lakeland Highlands Canning Co., 309 U. S. 310, 316 (1940). Situations,
however, may occasionally arise where the answer to a question of law is sufficiently plain that, in the interest of judicial
economy, it may be categorically resolved upon review of a
preliminary injunction. In this case, for example, the appellants themselves have conceded that the hospital requirement in § 3209 is invalid, 11 and there is no reason why the
Court of Appeals should not have accepted that concession.
Nor is there any reason why the Court of Appeals could not
have noted the applicability of our then recent opinions in
Akron, Ashcroft and Simopoulos in deciding the questions
presented. Even if the Court of Appeals erred in its disposition of any issues, "the findings of fact and conclusions of
law made by a court granting a preliminary injunction are not
binding at trial on the merits." University of Texas v.
Camenisch, 451 U. S. 390, 395 (1981). Any errors in the final judgment may be corrected upon review in this Court or
the Court of Appeals.
With respect to appellants' substantive contentions, we
note that they embrace a number of different statutory provisions, and that appellants themselves suggest that review of
some provisions would be premature "at this time." Juris.
Statement 4 n. 3. Thus, they do not now ask us to review
the Court of Appeals' holding of invalidity with respect to
either the regulation of health and disability insurance in
§ 3215(e) of the Act, or the 24-hour waiting period in § 3205, 12
but they have preserved their objections to both rulings and
state that they desire to offer evidence concerning the latter
at trial. 13
See 737 F. 2d, at 293.
See Juris. Statement 4 n. 3; id., at 23 n. 14.
18
See Juris. Statement 22 n. 13.
11

11
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Appellants object to the Court of Appeals' ruling on the detailed reporting requirements in § 3214(a), (b), and (h) contending that the magnitude of any increase in the cost of
abortions caused by those provisions is merely speculative.
Juris. Statement 18-20. For the purpose of the preliminary
injunction ruling, however, the appellants had stipulated that
the reporting requirements would increase such costs. 14
Given that stipulation, plus the detailed description by the
Court of Appeals, 15 it seems apparent that appellants' contention on this matter can be addressed more effectively after a
trial on the merits at which they may offer whatever proof
they deem relevant. The appellants other specific objections
concern the proper interpretation of certain sections of the
Act, 16 questions of severability, 17 and the significance of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's failure to adopt rules governing the procedure for obtaining judicial consent to the abor737 F. 2d, at 302 (referring to Stipulation ~ 194).
"§ 3214: Reporting.
"Ths section of the Act requires in (a), (b), and (h) detailed reporting
with regard to each abortion performed irrespective of the state of pregnancy. The physician must sign a report to be filed the following month,
which includes fourteen categories of data, including but not limited to
identification of the physician, facility, and referring physician, agency or
service; the political subdivision and state in which the woman resides; her
age, race and marital status; the number of her prior pregnancies; the date
of her last menstrual period and probable gestational age of the unborn
child; the type of procedure performed; complications; the 'length and
weight of the aborted unborn child when measurable'; the '[b]asis for any
medical judgment that a medical emergency existed,' the viability report
referred to in section 3211(a), and the method of payment for the abortion.
Another detailed report must be filed by the physician as to each woman
who has 'complications' from an abortion or attempted abortion." 737 F.
2d, at 301-302 (quoting statute).
16
For example, the Court of Appeals interpreted the scope of the medical emergency exception to the second physician requirement for a postviability abortion in light of its view of the inter-relationship of§§ 3210(a),
(b), (c) and 3203. See 737 F. 2d, at 300-301.
17
See, e. g., 737 F. 2d, at 296 (discussing informed consent requirements
in § 3205(a)).
14
16
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tion of a minor, 18 rather than the Court of Appeals' understanding of the governing constitutional principles applicable
to these sections of the Act. On matters of this kind, we
normally defer to the Court of Appeals' understanding of
state law and practice. Cf. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341,
345-346 (1976).

Because the factual stipulation was made solely for the
purpose of the preliminary injunction ruling, because it was
prepared prior to our decisions in Akron, Ashcroft, and
Simopoulos, and because appellants themselves desire toreserve some of their challenges to the Court of Appeals' judgment until after a full trial on the merits, we consider it
especially inappropriate to address the merits of appellants'
constitutional contentions at this stage of the litigation. We
also note that appellants do not assert that the judgment of
the Court of Appeals is in conflict with any decision rendered
after our opinions were announced in the Akron, Ashcroft,
and Simopoulos cases.
Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed and, treating the jurisdictional statement~ertiorari, the petition
is denied.

IB737 F. 2d, at 297.
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CHAMBER S OF"

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

January 10, 1985

Re:

No. 84-495

Thornburg v. American College, Et Al.

Dear John,
It seems to me that the reasons you state in your Per
Curiam for dismissing the appeal in this case are not ---reasons which fall within any of the traditional c~egories
under which we have dismissed appeals in the past: "not a
proper appeal," jKno jurisdiction" and the like. The
"policies disfavoring piecemeal appellate review and
premature adjudication of constitutional question" to which
you refer on page 2 of the Per Curiam are supported by
citations to an appeal from-a-state court which was
dismissed for lack of a substantial record, Rescue Army v.
Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549, a writ of
certiorari to a state court which was dismissed, Minnick v.
California Department of Corrections, 452 u.s. la5i and an
appeal from the Court of Appeals to the Fifth Circuit which
was decided on the merits, New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 u.s.
297 (1976). Whatever may be the JUrisprudential
considerations that counsel against piecemeal review or
avoidance of constitutional questions, I would think that
Congress has finally answered this question ·when it gave
these particular appellants the right to appeal under
§1254{2). I am going to continue to vote to note probable
jurisidction.

n

~

Justice Stevens
cc:

The Conference

sincerelyV

dro 03/26/85

MEMORANDUM

To:

JUSTICE POWELL

From: Dan
Re:

Thornburg

v.

American

College

of

Obstetricians

and

Gynecologinsts, No. 84-495. ( ~~ ~ _ ~
Ch-f-

? ~ '.s

JUSTICE

~~ ~~

STEVENS has

circulated

a

this case which would dismiss the appeal.
joined it.

draft

per

curiam

in

No other justice has

As JUSTICE STEVENS indicates, it is not clear whether

~

the Court has jurisdiction to review preliminary injunctions in
cases like this.

Uncertainty, however,

is more reason to post-

~

pone jurisdiction to a hearing on the merits than reason to dismiss.

The cases on page 2 that JUSTICE STEVENS cites for

proposition

that

policies

disfavoring

piecemeal

review

the

further

counsel dismissal in the case are, as JUSTICE REHNQUIST suggests
in his memo of Jan. 10, distinguishable.
I am hesitant to recommend that you

join JUSTICE STE-

VENS'S opinion as your Conference notes indicate you thought you
might.

As my original annotations to the cert pool memo suggest,

neither of the other courses is totally satisfactory either.

As

it stands now, though, there are four votes to postpone jurisdiction to the merits and I am not quite sure what difference your
~

vote will make.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
RICHARD THORNBURGH ET AL. v. AMERICAN
COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND
GYNECOLOGISTS ET AL.

~
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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS (J • / ~
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
-...)' ~
No. 84-495.

Decided April-, 1985

JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting.
28 U. S. C. 1254 provides:
"Cases in the Courts of Appeals may be reviewed by the
Supreme Court by the following methods:
(1) By writ of certiorari . . . .
(2) By appeal by a party relying on a state statute
held by a Court of Appeals to be invalid as repugnant to
the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States

"
Notwithstanding this clear directive from Congress that
we review "by appeal" a decision of a Court of Appeals that
holds a state statute to be violative of the Constitution, the
Court today attempts to convert this congressional directive
into nothing more than an allowance of discretionary review
by writ of certiorari. Many students of the subject have
urged Congress to repeal this Court's "mandatory jurisdiction," but they have thus far been unsuccessful; I do not believe that it is within the province of this Court to accomplish
by indirection that which Congress has thus far refused to do.
There can be no doubt that this case properly qualifies for
appellate jurisdiction under § 1254(2), inasmuch as the Court
of Appeals squarely held, on the basis of the record before it,
that several provisions of the Pennsylvania statute violate
the Federal Constitution. Nevertheless, the Court states
that "in the particular circumstances of this case the policies
disfavoring piecemeal appellate review and premature adjudication of constitutional questions persuade us that the ap-
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peal should be dismissed." Ante, at 2. The cases that the
Court cites for this proposition singularly fail to support it.
Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331 U. S.
549 (1947), was an appeal from a state court, which was dismissed after argument because of the highly abstract and
speculative nature of the constitutional questions presented.
Minnick v. California Department of Corrections, 452 U.S.
105 (1981), was a case that came here by writ of certiorari
and was dismissed after argument for want of a final judgment. New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U. S. 297 (1976), was decided on the merits after argument. None of them remotely
supports the action that the Court takes in the present case.
At the close of its opinion, the Court states that "appellants
do not assert that the judgment of the Court of Appeals is in
conflict with any decision rendered after our opinions were
announced in the Akron, Ashcroft, and Simopoulous cases."
This, of course, under our Rules is an entirely sound basis for
denying certiorari, but has nothing at all to do with whether
we will hear an appeal. Before today, when an appeal is
concededly within a jurisdictional statute such as 28 U. S. C.
§ 1254(2), we have either heard oral argument and decided it
by written opinion, or summarily affirmed the decision of the
District Court. There can be no doubt that this Court has
been sharply divided in the most recent round of cases involving the constitutional limitations upon the state's authority
to regulate abortions. But unwillingness to face additional
cases in this area when presented under jurisdictional statutes that clearly require us to hear the contentions asserted
is scarcely an appropriate method for avoiding what may be
additional contentiousness and division.
I would note probable jurisdiction over this appeal.
~
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

April 10, 1985

No. 84-495

Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists

Dear Bill,
Please join me in your dissent.
Sincerely,

Justice Rehnquist
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June 3, 1985

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL , JR .

Dearest Molly:
It was great to visit with you on the telephone yesterday. It turned out to be a long day, as Mother and Quincy
missed the 6:10 ·flight . from Boston to Washington. They ended up having to take a shuttle to LaGuardia and a second
shuttle from there to Washington, arriving about 10:00 p.m ••
Quincy will be with us for a couple of days.
Mother was much impressed by St. Paul's - the people,
the physical facilities and the traditions of the school.
Jody reports that your mother was a big hit.
At your suggestion, I have checked the Pennsylvania
Abortion case granted for next Term and you are right that
one of the numerous parties is Planned Parenthood of Pennsylvania. Although I ~o not think the views or activities
of my daughters would disqualify me in this case, I appreciate your sensitivity in preferring not to become a board
member in Utah.
At your suggestion, I also talked to Penny and she will
follow your example. I add only that, as all four of you
know, you are free - of course - to make your own judgments
on particular issues. I do not expect you to agree with
Mother and me anymore than I may always agree with you. I
am not above trying, however, to help each of you "see the
light" in national elections.
We know, and are grateful, that our four children share
the basic values that ate our family's inheritance over many
generations.
As ever,

- ':

.......
~·

Mrs. Christopher J. Sumner
2660 Walker Lane
: · ~Salt Lake Clty, Utah .84117
cc - Mrs. Basil T. Carmody
9 Roslyn Road
Richmond, Virg ini~L . 23226
:.. ...._1.

LFP/vde

2.
P.S.

I am happy to enclose a check for $300 that, together with
the ncreditn you mentioned, should cover your travel expenses for our reunion last Thanksgiving. It is such a joy
to have all of you with us, it is our privilege to help out
with travel expenses.
cc - 84-495 Thornbourgh v. American College of
Obstetricians

/ aml J ?/27/85

(~
To:
Capell, Mike, Anne, & Bill
From: Annmarie
Re:
Cases for O.T. '85
~

The Justice asked me to call to your attention to~sets of cases
that will be argued this Term. He would like you to prepare
"summer bench memos" on them, or at least generally get going on
them soon. Unfortunately, these cases aren't scheduled for the
first sitting.
(1) The abortion cases. No. 84-49 ~ Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians, and No. ~~ ' Diamond v. Charles
involve the constitutionality of Penn. and Illinois abortion
statutes. The Justice voted to DWSFQ. He would like the bench
memo on these cases to focus on the differences, if any, between
fue statutes at issue here and those challenged in the Akron
ordinance. Doesn't his opinion in Akron control?
(2) Punitive damages cases. No. 84-1601, Aetna Life
Insurance Co. v. Lavoie, involves an equa:r-protection challenge
to an Alabama statute that provides an automatic 10% penalty of
money judgment against an unsuccessful defendant, but no similar
penalty against an unsuccessful plaintiff. There is also a
constitutional challenge to the award of $3.5 million in punitive
damages. There is a second case involving the same statute and a
challenge to a similar huge punitive damages award, Nationwide
msurance v. ?. The latter is on the Conference list for
September 30,-1985, and presumably will be held for Aetna.
m both Aetna and Nationwide, Justice Powell, as Circuit
Justice, entered a stay of the JUdgment of the Alabama Supreme
Court pending this Court's disposition. The Justice is extremely
interested in the constitutionality of punitive damages, and
would a bench memo addressing this issue in some detail.
Dan was supposed to put together a file of materials on punitive
damages; I haven't been able to find it, although behind Sally's
desk there are files on the Dun & Bradstreet case.
(For awhile,
the Justice's opinion in Dun & Bradstreet was going to take up
punitive damages.) One other place to look is Griswold's amicus
brief in a case decided this Term, Mass. Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Russell. The Justice liked its discussion of punitive damages.
Ginny will check with Dan when he gets to Charlottesville. In
the meantime, someone should prepare a bench memo in the Aetna
case and keep an eye out for the Nationwide case.

Finally, Frank Lorson in the Clerk's Office handled the
stay applications in both Aetna and Nationwide. He may be able
to help you with background on these ,cases.
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BENCH MEMORANDUM
~=

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

Date: September 26, 1985

Cabell
No. 84-495, Richard Thornberg, et al. v. American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, et al. ( Cfi~
Argument: Tuesday, November 5, 1985

Questions Presented
1.

May a Court of Appeals properly declare provisions

of state law unconstitutional on appeal from a district court's
denial of a motion for a preliminary injunction?
2.

Did the Court of Appeals misapply precedents of this

Cburt in declaring unconstitutional numerous provisions of Pennsylvania's Abortion Control Act?

I.

BACKGROUND
The

Pennsylvania

Abortion

Control

Act

was

enacted

on

June 11, 1982, and was scheduled to become effective in 180 days.

m October 1982, the appellees filed their complaint.
29,

1982,

they filed a motion for

preliminary

On October

injunction.

The

ilistrict court granted a preliminary injunction staying enforcement of section 3205 of the Act (24-hour waiting period) but de;:::::= - \\
nied a ':Preliminary injunction as to the remainder of the Act.

--

Both sides appealled.

-

After briefing and oral argument, the Third Circuit held
fue cases pending this Court's decisions in City of Akron v. Akron Center
and

for

Planned

(1983).

Reproductive Health,

Parenthood

Association

Inc.,
v.

462

u.s.

Ashcroft,

416
462

(1983),

u.s.

476

The ~ourt of ~eals then requested additional briefing,

e /71

~ard reargument, and declared most of the challenged provisions ,.t~~
~
-

unconstitutional.
Appeal to this Court followed.

This Court stated that

it would hear argument, but did not note jurisdiction.

ll.
A.

DISCUSSION
The Third Circuit should not have reviewed the constitutionality of the statute when only the appeal of the
preliminary injunction was before it.
The only question properly before the Third Circuit

whether

the

preliminary

district court erred
injunction.

Neither

in denying
party

had

was~

almost entirely a
requested

that

the

Court of Appeals pass on the constitutionality of the challenged

______..,

provisions.

issue on such review is only whether the issu-

f>

ance or denial of the injunction, in the light of the applicable
standard,

lm,

constituted

abuse

of

discretion.

Doran

v.

Salem

411

u.s.

1n Mayo v. Lakeland Highlands Canning Co., 309 U.S.

310,

Inc.,

u.s.

an

422

922,

932

(1975);

Brown v.

Chote,

452, 457 (1973).

316

(1940),

declared

the Court held

that a

unconstitutional by a

~

Q

state statute should not be

~

district court if a preliminary

.t> L

injunction is granted to the plaintiff to protect his interests
during

the ensuing

trict Court]

litigation.

"The question before

[the Dis-

was not whether the act was constitutional .•• but

was whether the showing made raised serious questions, under the
federal
act,

Constitution

pending

final

and
hearing,

t.pon the complainants."

disclosed
would

that enforcement of

inflict

the

irreparable damages

Id., at 316.

&though it is true that the Third Circuit had a factual
and

legal

~

presentation

that

was

"unusually complete,"

had

re-

-- ~~

~ived

two sets of briefs, heard two sessions of oral argument,

and undertook plenary review in the interest of "judicial econoAppeals

ny,"

ality

jumped

Although

is not an egregious misstep by that court,

takes this case,

the Third

it may wish to signal circuit courts that this~ ~

not allow proceedings here after Courts of Appeals have undertakon their own motion similar plenary review of the statute's

constitutionality.

~

if this Court

case represents a rare exception and that the Court usually will

m

,

C.~.LL.

The signal may help staunch the flow of abor-

tion cases into this Court.

B.

to review this case one wa
The appellees argue as an initial matter that the Court

should dismiss this appeal because the Third Circuit did not direct the entry of

judgment for appellees on any issue,

dered further proceedings before the district court.
that although

28

u.s.c.

§

"finality" requirement,

m the
351

arg~

They

not contain an express

this Court has found such a

requireme~

See South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. v. Flemming,

past.

u.s.

does

1254(2)

but or-

901

(citing

(1956)

Slaker

v.

278

u.s.

188

opinions

have

ex-

O'Conner,

(1929)).

The

appellants

counter

pressed doubt concerning whether
9..1Ch appeals
ti2.7

u.s.

.Inc. ,

422

under

297,

9 2 2,

(1976)

927

recent

such finality

section 1254 ( 2) •

301-302

u.s.

that

is required for

See New Or leans v.

(per curiam); Doran v.

( 19 7 5) •

Dukes,

Salem Inn,

They argue in the alternative

that if there is a finality requirement, this judgment is sufficiently final for this Court to note appellate jurisdiction.
In any event,

__________...,

Supreme Court review.
m

the

----

issue is not an effective barrier to

(Justice Stevens tried to preclude

review~

this ground last spring, but no other Justice joined his

curiam).

As Justice Rehnquist wrote ten years ago:

"There is authority, questioned but never put to rest,
that § 1254(2) is available only when review is sought
dE a final judgment.
The present appeal, however,
seeks review of the affirmance of a preliminary injunction.
We need not resolve these issues, which
have neither been briefed nor argued, because we in anY
erent have certiorari jurisdiction under 28 ~§
21 3.
As we have pre 1ous y one 1n an 1 entical situa"t'rnn, we dismiss the appeal and, treating the papers
as a petition for certiorari, grant the writ of certiorari."

T'i"

.~.~

per~

.D:>ran v.

Salem

Inn,

Inc.,

422

u.s.

922,

927

(1975)

(citations

omitted).
C.

The Constitutionality of the Challenged Provisions
There are five challenges to the Third Circuit's hold~

ings.

--

I believe all of them are controlled by this Court's prior

-----

cpinions, and that this Court should affirm the Third Circuit in
each instance.
(1)
~06

Parental

Consent

or

Judicial

Approval.

Section

J ~.Zt>/.

of the Act requires unemancipated minors to obtain the con-

sent of the parents or a court order before they can undergo an
abortion.

The Third Circuit rejected challenges on equal protec-

tion and due process grounds and refused to hold the section unconstitutional on its face.
this

section pending

The court did enjoin enforcement of

promulgation of

rules by the

Pennsylvania

fupreme Court that would ensure "confidentiality and dispatch."
In
~nnsylvania

November

1984,

after

this appeal was docketed,

Supreme Court promulgated rules for judicial

ization proceedings.

t

the

Pa-'""'

aut~or- ~~'

t

The rules establish a clear procedure for
-

"::!!

l'f.rf'
lnJ-

-

the filing of a petition; there are no filing fees; the rules set cf...s'UIJ

forth the required contents of a petition; and the rules direct ~
court personnel

to assist

the minor

in preparing

the petition.

The appellees argue initial consideration of this matter should
~

made by the district court since the parties have had no op-

portunity

to develop a

factual

record,

and

the Court does not

have the benefit of a lower court assessment of the issues.
appellants urge vacating the Third Circuit's judgment.

The

5 3u~

I believe that the new rules do not save section 3206.
is true that a State's interest in protecting immature minors

ft

will sustain a requirement of a ~onsent substitute, either paren~1

l.\

or judicial.

But a State is also required to provide a]Lal-

'"'

ternate procedure whereby a pregnant minor may demonstrate that

. . . .___

'"

;----;.

-

_;__ _:.. . .,::.,._;....._____

.....

lllli~~~--...c,__

a:~·llt!!!!-=,...-

ffie is sufficiently mature to make the abortion decision herself
or that, despite her immaturity, an abortion would be in her
_ ,

~

0

interests.

------'

Although

the

(1}

ather

Akron,

supra,

rules

at

' -

._..,.,

4 3 9- 4 4 0 : Ash c r of t ,

in Ashcroft

allowed

-

supra,

the court

at

to find
~lo _.

the minor should have majority rights for the purpose

of consent to the abortion, or

(2)

~~

Ptt....

the abortion is in the best

interest of the immature minor, Pennsylvania's rules do not pe - ~~
mit a court to take the second route.

~ct1on

3206 continues to be

I therefore believe t a t Z "

unconstitutiona~and

fin-~

that no

~
~

ing in the district court can save the provision because the a -

~

~

rendant rules that are facially deficient.
(2)

3205 (a) (1)

Informed Consent and Printed Information.

~- 7 r-l

sets forth five categories of informa_t..ion that

--

tient must receive.

-----oo~s~uen_3S
of

(!:) -

She must be told:

abortion; ~he

probable

fetus at the time the abortion is

L-1.. ...........
~

Secti n

~~--.;:~,.,

unforeseen psychological
---·~

gestational

performed~he

age

of

the

~~

availability of

(Vthe obligatio~£ rredical benefits for pre- and neo-natal care;
the father to support the child;
~inted

down the

information.

an~er

right to review certain
IJ

Relying on Akron, the Third Circuit struck /

-s.a

.. ~
prov1s1on.
Here, Akron controls.

p II

Both require that a woman be in-

formed not only of the particular risks associated with the pro-

*

15/.4.~~ G"~6 ~

f.1 "" ~-M-1-~

~ ~~~1- ~~~~s .4 ·

..._ ~-

f

·~ ,

cedure, but also of the psychological and physicial effects in,

eluding hemorrhage, risks to subsequent pregnancies, and sterility.

Both

require

alternatives

to

information

abortion.

concerning

Both

require

agencies

that

information

offer

about

the

fetus' probable gestational age and the availability of detailed
information

concerning

the

tional?imJ?~ications

/1.~

-

They

of

the

fetus.

The

o not simply .. require that a physician

Pennsylvania

445.

character is tics

of

having

an

;v411l- ~

insist upon recitation of a

supra,

Akron,

abortion ...

.. lengthy and

at

inflexible

list .. and

-

ffiip.

\'

Id.

Section

3205

is

therefore

requirement that the patient be
that

told

unconstitutional.

(The

the name of the physician

is to perform the abortion is not objectionable, but that

~ction

is not severable from the rest of the provision.)
The Court of Appeals also held that section 3208, order(~

ing availability of certain printed materials
references

to

matomical

and

inextricably
invalid.

public

agencies,

information

about

physiological character is tics of
intertwined

with

section

the

the

and

3205,

geographic
probable

fetus)

was

was

similarly

I believe this holding is correct, as there is no evi-

dence of legislative intend that section 3208 should stand alone.
It appears, however, that if a state so chose, it could undertake
an independent informational campaign relating to abortion.
/(

(3)

-

requires any physician performing an
1 possibility

~

The Second Physician Requirement.

Section 3210 (c)

aborti~where

there is the

of fetal surviva~\ to arrange for the attendance of a

second physician.

The second physician will be in charge of the

,--______

realth of the child.

The Third Circuit held that the provision

was unconstitutional for its failure to protect the health of the

.

rother.

~~-+.c.. A~~d ~.,.. ... ~ ~

This Court should aff1rm
.In

~---7

.1

L

~ r~"'tt·u4te. ~ ,-.,.¥U ,.,""'
the Court held that any second physic ian

Ashcroft,

·

----------------------~~?

requirement must have an exception for medical emergencies or a

';4.-

.

nu~
~

---~""----~~~-------------------- /.:.A
clause that precludes "an increased risk to •the life and healtf'I U41
cf

the woman."

Ashcroft, supra, at 483.

The Pennsylvania stat-

ute lacks this clause.
The appellants contend that this Court should read that
a provisio of section 3210 (a)
~ction

3210(a)

to cover 3210 (a)

through 3210 (c)·

provides: "It shall be a complete defense to any

charge brought against a physician for violating the requirement
cf this section that he concluded in good faith,

ical

that

judgment

naternal life or

the

health."

abortion was
I

believe

in his best med-

necessary

to preserve

that the Court of Appeals

was right to construe the exception to apply only to the offenses
cutlined

in

section

class of offenses
rexus

is

3210(a).

in each of

Section
its

three

"abortion after viability."

lieve that part

(a)

controls

(b)

3210

and

covers

a

separate

subdivisions;

the only

There is no reason to be(c).

In fact,

such an in-

terpretation would make the verbatim repetition of the "offense

...,

definition" in each of the three subdivisions surplusage.
(4)

Regulations

Encouraging

----------

a

Live

Birth.

Section 5''32./ tJ

3210(b) of the Act requires a physician performing an abortion_ on
~..._.
'
----a viable fetus to use the abortion method most likely to produce

~

_____....

a live birth,

-

-

~----'-~-----------------------------------"would produce a significantly

unless that method

greater

medical

w::>man."

The

risk

Third

to

the

Circuit

life

struck

or

health

down

this

of

the

pregnant

provision

on

the

ground that this Court has held that the State's interest in live
a

live

birth will pose any greater health risk to the mother.
This provision

is unconstitutional for

the same reason

fuat an earlier Pennsylvania statute was found infirm in Colautti
v.

Franklin,

439

u.s.

379,

400

(i979).

In Colautti,

the Court .,,...~.>,D

held that an earlier statute impermissibly required the doctor
"make a 'trade-off' between the woman's health and
vi val."
f

-

to~

fetal sur-

The new Pennsylvania statute, similarly fails to require

"'

I

Reporting Requirements.

~Section 3~4 requires de- ~
-::::..-..

tailed reporting:

---~
"The physician must

sign a report to be filed the
following month, which includes fourteen categories of
c:hta, including but not limited to identification of
the physician, facility, and referring physician, agency or service; the political subdivision and state in
which the woman resides; her age, race and marital status; the number of her prior pregnane ies; the date of
her last menstrual period and probable gestational age
c£ the unborn child; the type of procedures performed;
complications; the 'length and weight of the aborted
mborn child when measurable'; the '[b] as is for any
medical judgment that a medical emergency existed'; the
l::asis for a physician's determination that a fetus is
not viable; and the method of payment for the abortion."

American College v. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d 283, 301-302 (CA3 1984).
The Court of Appeals held these requirements unconstitutional.
In Planned

52

(1976),

~

~

that maternal health be the paramount consideration.
( 5)

..P.,.,...,-

,~

V"

Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428

u.s.

the Court upheld then unspecified reporting require-

ments as long as they were "reasonably directed to the preserva-

tion of maternal health"

and

"properly respect [ed]

ronfidentiality and privacy."

Id. at 80.

reporting

be

requirements

cccomplish,
what

"through

[the

Court]

would

the

sheer

has held

The Court warned that

struck down

burden of

a patient's

if

they

sought to

recordkeeping detail,

to be an otherwise unconstitutional

restriction."

___

__, stand under Danforth.
to

~iled

.is

I believe that these reporting requirements are too de-

similar

(age,

race,

mformation
abortions

d

to

information

that

Although some of the information
would

be

required

"political subdivision," and state)
is

reasonably

related

to

gathering

in

a

census

and some of the
statistics

on

(last menstrual period, probable gestational age, type

procedure performed) , the most burdensome information is also

the least appropriate for aggregate data.

It is unreasonable to

that useful statistics can be compiled from "the basis for

~sume

oosis for the physician's determination that a medical emergency
exists."

I do not believe that the requirements are severable,

and thus all of section 3214 must fall.

ill.

CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals properly determined that five pro-

visions of the Pennsylvania abortion statute unconstitutionally
mfringed on a woman's right to an abortion:

1.

Parental Consent or Judicial Approval.

The rules pro-

mulgated by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania have probably corrected any constitutional infirmities.

2.

Informed Consent and Printed Information.

The specified

litany intrudes into the physician-patient relationship.
It

is

~ron.

indistinguishable

from provisions struck down in

The provisions providing for printed information

are inextricably intertwined.

3.

Second Physician
exception

for

a

Requirem¥.Jl ~ · "~s require~ t
- ~

medi"C: al

emergency,

and

thus

lacks an - / '
conflicts

mth the implication in Akron that such provisions must
have

an exception

that

allows

for

preserva~ion

of

tre

nother 's health.

~

Regulations Encourgaging a Live Birth.

These provisions

impermissibly require a doctor to make a

trade-off be-

tween the woman's health and fetal survival.

5.

Reporting Requirements.

Section 3214 places an unneces-

sary burden on the physician with its requirements that
he disclose
'Ihese

the basis for certain medical evaluations.

informational

~egation,

requests go beyond

statistical ag-

which is what I believe Danforth contemplat-

ed.
'fuis Court should affirm the Court of Appeals'
that the provisions are unconstitutional.

is called striking down the

Chinnis

finding

In some chambers, this

statute. [~-~~

-----1
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No. 84-495, Thornburgh v. Am. College of Obstetricians
No. 84-1379, Diamond v. Charles
Jurisdiction and Standing
You have asked whether

it is possible for the Court to

dismiss the appeals in Thorburgh and Diamond on the basis of defects

in

jurisdiction or

standing.

The answer

Court can dismiss and deny both cases.
nents

supporting

jurisdiction and

is

"Yes."

This

There are, however, argu-

standing

that

you

should

be

aware of.

'IHORNBURGH
The appellees argue that the Court should dismiss this
appeal because the Third Circuit did not direct entry of judgment
for

the appellees on any issue,

before the district court.

but ordered further proceedings

Appellants concede that the order of

the Court of Appeals is not final,
of finality under §1254(2)
the purpose of
(1929)

should

but argue that a requirement

is inconsistent with the language and

the statute -- Slaker v.

O'Connor,

Appellants

be overruled.

278

u.s.

188

suggested yesterday at

oral argument that this Court could also grant cert if the case
did not meet the requirements of §1254(2).
Although §1254(2) does not contain an express "finality"
requirement, this Court has found such a requirement in the past.
See South Carolina Electric
(1956)

(citing

held that

Slaker

v.

&

Gas Co. v.

O'Connor,

278

Flemming,

u.s.

188

351

u.s.

(1929),

901

which

"appeals to this Court from circuit courts of appeals

lie only from final judgments or decrees," id., at 189).

page 2.

Appellants

counter

that

that requirement into question.
Q:leans

v.

curiam)

(citations omitted):

922,

927

Dukes

(1975)

Power

Co.,

the Court has

recently called

They rely on statements from New

u.s.

427

Doran v.

(Rehnquist, J.).

297,

301-302

Salem Inn,

(1976)

Inc.,

(Qg£

u.s.

422

It is true that the Court has

flirted with the idea of dispensing with the finality requirement
of §1254 ( 2)

in some instances.

fut the Court has not made a statement that would confer
appellate
Slaker.

jurisdiction here.
I

believe

that

The Court would have to overrule

overruling

Slaker

is

a

bad

idea:

It

would encourage piecemeal review of litigation and increase this
Cburt's
abortion

appellate
case

docket.

would

have

Moreover,
the

overruling

additional

Slaker

deleterious

in

an

effect

of

signaling the parties that this Court will take an active role in
reviewing state abortion statutes.

Finally, as Justice Brennan

focused on in oral argument, in this litigation the finality requirement seems especially important because the Court of Appeals
rendered

its decision on a stipulation of facts that is subject

to amendment by either party on remand.

It is possible -- al-

though extremely unlikely -- that such amendment could alter this
Cbur t 's
~at

analysis

(i.e. ,

testimony

from public health officials

all of the reporting requirements are necessary for the com-

pilation of essential public health statistics) .
The

alternative

is

to

grant

certiorari.

In

my

bench

memo, I had relied upon the availability of writ of certiorari to
ensure jurisdiction.

Justice Stevens had tried to preclude re-

view of Thor burgh last Term on

jurisdictional grounds,

and

not

page 3.

one Justice expressly joined his dismissal.

But if the tide has

turned and there are not four votes to grant cert

(CA3 has ren-

dered a correct decision), then the Court can and should dismiss
and deny.

DIAMOND
On

the mootness

issue,

section 6 ( 4)

was enjoined from

the day it was passed, so the controversy regarding old 6 ( 4)
~guably

moot.

Section 6(1) was in force for eight months.

is
The

state has promised not to prosecute anyone under this older section.

Although

the possibility of bad faith from the State is

minute, I believe that the voluntary cessation of illegal conduct
does not moot the case for section 6(1).
On to standing.

The Illinois Attorney General has filed

a vague letter with this Court that can be construed as either
stating that the State has adopted the intervenors' position or
declining to be an appellant in this proceeding.

The text of the

letter is reproduced in Appellants Reply Brief.
Originally I
the
10.4.

State's

adoption

thought that this letter could be read as
of

Rule 10.4, however,

the

intervenors'

position

under

Rule

is a measure to ensure that all par-

ties received notice of the appeal.

It does not confer standing.

Because the State has never filed a Notice of Appeal with this
Court, it cannot be deemed an appellant.
The question thus becomes whether

the intervenors have

standing to litigate the constitutionality of the abortion statute.

It is clear to me that the intervenors do not have standing

page 4.

simply because they are pediatricians.

The chance that infants

who survive abortions may become his patients is too speculative.
See Appt Reply Brief 15 n.l2.

The professional and economic in-

terest

standards

in

,.ensuring

that

the

of

the

profession

mintained .. is not a sufficiently concrete interest.
Appellants
~gument

have

suggested

for

the

first

that the controversy over attorney's fees

leged in excess of $100,000)

are

!d.
time

at

oral

(an award al-

confers sufficient adverseness and

interest to present a justiciable case or controversy.

The short

answer is that there is nothing I could find in the briefs or the
record that refers to such a controversy.

Generally, the Court

confines itself to the record in assessing material facts in the
litigation.
Even if there were material in the record concerning the
alleged

fee

dispute,

appellants

still would not have standing.

The fee dispute concerns the propriety of an award of attorney's
fees;

the constitutionality of the statute has been settled by

the Court of Appeals.

Intervenors should not be able to litigate

that latter issue further on the basis of a collateral dispute.
I do not believe that intervenors have standing to argue
the constitutionality of the statute before this Court.

tbvember 7, 1985
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November 7, 1985
PERSONAL
84-495 Thornburgh v. American College
84-1379 Diamond v. Charles

Dear BUl:
In accord with our conversation, I have taken a
further look - \·dth the ass.istance of my clerk, Cabell
Chinnis - and I conclude that we have no jurisdiction in
Thornburgh unless we want to overrule Slaker v. O'Connor.
Nor do the intervenors in Diamond have standing.
It would be a good thing for this Court instit.utionally not to review routinely abortion cases where states
accept the validity of our constitutional cases. In both of
these cases, the state purports to follow our decisions.
Where a state gets out of line egregiously, we should review. Here, however, both courts below have made decisions
that will require the legislatures to reexamine the
statutes.
Sincerely,

Justice Brennan
lfp/ss
Enc.

November 7, 1985

84-495 Thornburgh v. American College
84-1479 Diamond v. Charles

Dear Chief:
At the time the Court took these cases, I thought
we had jurisdiction and voted to affirm in both.
Following the oral argument and a more careful look
at the briefs, I have concluded that we can dismiss both,
and this will be my vote.
As it may be of some helo, I enclose a copy of a
memorandum prepared by my clerk, Cabell Chinnis, following
the arguments on yesterday. In a word, I think we would
have to overrule Slaker v. O'Connor to take juri~diction in
Thornburgh, and cle'irly there is no standinq by the Intervenors to raise the constitutional question in Diamond.
It would be a good thing for this Court institutionally not to review routinely abortion cases where states
accept the validity of our constitutional cases. In both of
these cases, the state purports to follow our decisions.
Where a state gets out of line egregiously, we should review. Here, ho\>Tever, both courts below have made decisions
that will require the legislatures to reexamine the
statutes.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss
Enc.

o..w... .J . BRENNAN, .JR.

CHAMBERS

.JUSTICE

November 12, 1985

J

No. 84-495
Thornburgh v. American College
of Obstetricians

Dear Chief,
Harry

will

try

his

hand

at

an

opinion for the Court in the above case.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

February 6, 1986

84-495 Thornburgh v. American College

Dear Harry:
Thank you for the opportunt tv to have a prior look
at the draft of your opinion.
1y general :i.mpression is that it is excellent.
I
have one minor clarifying Auggestion. It may not be entirely clear that a woman's constitutional right to make the
abortion decision is usually unfettered only during the
first trimester, the peri.od prior to viability. I find this
ambiguity, for example, in the last sentence of the last
full paragraph on page 23. It may also exist at other
points in the opinion.

You asked particul21rly for my opinion as to Part V.
I agree that it is indeed "unusual" for the Solicitor General, as an amicus curiae, to ask us to overrule major constitutional decisions. I would prefer, however, for the Court
not to critici.ze the Solicitor General specifically. My
judgment is that even those who will applaud your decision
will find the reaffirmation of Roe v. ~Jade that i.s implicit
throughout your opinion and explicit on page 10 to be sufficient. Also, we have already rebuffed the Solicitor General
to some extent by denying his request to argue orally.
The substance of what vou have said in Part V could
be retaineif - I hope without reference specifically to the
Solicitor General. There is at least one other amicus brief
that urges us to overrule Roe v. Wade. You could omit the
paragraph on p. 22, and commence Part V along the following
lines:
"Although appellants challenge the merits
of the Third Circuit's decision so1ely on the
ground that the Court of Appeals misapplied
Roe v. Wade and its successors, various parties appearing as amici curiae in support of
appellants have urged us to take this occa-

2.

sion to overrule those cases entirely.
decline the invitation . "

We

A few stylistic changes in the last full paragraph on page
23 would also be necessary to keep the qenerality of the
reference to these amici curiae .
I would like to add in closinq that I particularly
like your reference to the fact that honorable persons can
disagree on this issue. I also think vour paragraph that
begins near the bottom of. page 23 - your final substanti.ve
paragraph - is excellent .

view .

I

Again, my thanks for the opportunity of prior relook forward to joining your opinion.
Sincerely,

Justice Blackmun
lfp/ss

-------------

-~--~----------------------·----·--~------------------~----------~-----~

v
rights

Constitutional

do

not

have

always

easily

ascertainable boundaries, and controversy over the meaning of our
Nation's most majestic guarantees frequently has been turbulent.
As judges, however, we are sworn to uphold the law even when its
content gives rise to bitter dispute.

u.s.

1

(1958).

We

opinion in Roe, 410

recognized

u.s.,

at

the

See Cooper v. Aaron, 358
very

beginning of our

at 116, that abortion raises moral and

spiritual questions over which honorable persons can disagree
sincerely and profoundly.

But those disagreements did not then

and do not now relieve us of our duty to apply the Constitution
faithfully.
Our

cases

long

have

recognized

that

the

Constitution

embodies a promise that a certain private sphere of individual
liberty will be kept

largely beyond the

reach of government.

See, e.g., Carey v. Population Services International, 431
678

(1977);

Eisenstadt

Moore
v.

v.

East

Baird,

405

u.s.

Cleveland,

431

u.s.

(1972);

438

494

u.s.

(1977);

Griswold

v.

10

Connecticut, 381
268

u.s.

u.s.

479 (1965): Pierce ·v. Society of Sisters,

510 (1925): Meyer v. Nebraska, 262

also Whalen v. Roe, 429

u.s.

u.s.

390 (1923).

589, 598-600 (1977).

extends to women as well as to men.

See

20

That promise

Few decisions are more

personal and intimate, more properly private, or more basic to
individual dignity and autonomy,

than a woman's decision--with

the guidance of her physician and within the limits specified in
Roe--whether to end her pregnancy.
choice freely is fundamental.
would

protect

inadequately

a

A woman's right to make that

Any other result,
central

part

of

in our view,

the

sphere

of

liberty that our law guarantees equally to all.
The Court of Appeals correctly invalidated the specified
provisions

of

Pennsylvania's

1982 Abortion Control Act.

Its

judgment is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
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CHAMeE:RS 01'"

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

Personal
Re:

Amer. Colle e of Obstetricians

Dear Bi
een in communication with John by telephone several
times this weekend. As you know, he had some reservations about
Part V in its original form.
Lewis shared some of those reservations.
I now enclose a
John's full approval.
tions about it which,
posed opinion will go
in this form.
I very
have rendered.

rev1s1on of Part V which, I believe, has
Actually, he made some positive suggesI think, have strengthened it.
The proto the Duplicating Unit today with Part V
much appreciate the assistance all of you
Sincerely,
..

'

....

·' .

Justice Brennan
Justice Marshall
Justice Powellv/

CHAMI!IERS Of'

JUSTICE

w .. . J .

BRENNAN, JR.

February 11, 1986

No. 84-495

Thornburgh, et al. v. American
College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists, et al.

Dear Harry,
I agree.
Sincerely,

Justice Blackmun
Copies to the Conference

.§nprtntt (ijoud of tltt ~b ,jtatte

11Jaefringt.on, ~. <ij.

2ll~J!.~

CHAMBERS O F

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

February 12, 1986

Re:

No. 84-495-Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists

Dear Harry:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

~·
•
T.M.

Justice Blackmun
cc:

The Conference

FP.hruary 12, 19B6

84-495 Thornbut'qh v. American College

Dear Ha.rry:
Please join me.
~incerely,

,Just ice Blackmun

lfp/'3S
cc:

The Conference

i'up'-r.tuu <!f&tltrl £tf Hr.t ~nil.tb .i'tatt•
·~lht6J{itqlbtn. ~. <If. 2llc?"-'
CH.O.MBER S OF"

..JUSTIC E ..JOHN PAUL STEVENS

February 12,

Re:

986

84-495 - Thornburg v. American College
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,
et al.

Dear Harry:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

Justice Blackmun
Copies to the Conference

From:

Justice Blackmun

IO
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JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewing the District
Court's rulings upon a motion for a preliminary injunction.
The Court of Appeals held unconstitutional several provisions of Pennsylvania's current Abortion Control Act, 1982
Pa. Laws, Act No. 138, now codified as 18 Pa. Cons. Stat.
§ 3201 et seq. (1983) (Act). 1 Among the provisions ruled
invalid by the Court of Appeals were portions of§ 3205, relating to "informed consent"; § 3208, concerning "printed information"; §§ 3210(b) and (c), having to do with postviability
abortions; and § 3211(a) and §§ 3214(a) and (h), regarding reporting requirements. 2
1
The District Court had held invalid and had enjoined preliminarily only
the requirement of § 3205(a)(2) that at least 24 hours must elapse between
a woman's receipt of specified information and the performance of her abortion. 552 F . Supp. 791, 797-798, 811 (ED Pa. 1982).
2
The Court of Appeals also held § 3215(e) invalid. That section requires health-care insurers to make available, at a lesser premium, policies
expressly excluding coverage "for abortion services not necessary to avert
the death of the woman or to terminate pregnancies caused by rape or incest." This ruling on § 3215(e) is not before us.

l v:u;-L~
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I

The Abortion Control Act was approved by the Governor
of the Commonwealth on June 11, 1982. By its own terms,
however, see § 7 of the Act, it was to become effective only
180 days thereafter, that is, on the following December 8. It
had been offered as an amendment to a pending bill to regulate paramilitary training.
The 1982 Act was not the Commonwealth's first attempt,
after this Court's 1973 decisions in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S.
113, and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179, to impose abortion restraints. The State's first post-1973 Abortion Control Act,
1974 Pa. Laws, Act No. 209, was passed in 1974 over the
Governor's veto. After extensive litigation, various provisions of the 1974 statute were ruled unconstitutional, including those relating to spousal or parental consent, to the
choice of procedure for a postviability abortion, and to the
proscription of abortion advertisements. See Planned Parenthoo:JyAssn. v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554 (ED Pa.
1975), summarily aff'd in part sub nom. Franklin v. Fitzgerald, 428 U. S. 901 (1976), and summarily vacated in part, and
remanded, sub nom. Beal v. Franklin, 428 U. S. 901 (1976),
modified on remand (No. 74-2440) (ED Pa. 1977), aff'd sub
nom. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379 (1979). See also
Doe v. Zimmerman, 405 F. Supp. 534 (MD Pa. 1975).
In 1978, the Pennsylvania Legislature attempted to restrict access to abortion by limiting medical-assistance funding for the procedure. 1978 Pa. Laws, Act No. 16A (pp.
1506-1507) and Act No. 148. This effort, too, was successfully challenged in federal court, Roe v. Casey, 464 F. Supp.
487 (ED Pa. 1978), and that judgment was affirmed by the ·
Third Circuit. 623 F. 2d 829 (1980).
In 1981, abortion legislation was proposed in the Pennsylvania House as an amendment to a pending Senate bill to outlaw "tough-guy competitions." 3 The suggested amendA "tough guy competition" is a physical contact bout between persons
who lack professional experience and who attempt to render each other unconscious. See Note, 87 Dick. L. Rev. 373, 382, n. 84 (1983).
3
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ment, aimed at limiting abortions, was patterned after a
model statute deve ed b a Chica o-bas.e diiOilrofit antlabort~on.
See Note, Toward Constitutional
AbortiOn Control Legislation: The Pennsylvania Approach,
87 Dick. L. Rev. 373, 382, n. 84 (1983). The bill underwent
further change in the legislative process but, when passed,
was vetoed by the Governor. See 737 F. 2d 283, 288-289
(CA3 1984). Finally, the 1982 Act was formul ted, enacted,
an~ed.

Aft~!:J~.s~Act, b~ate,

the p:r:_esent litig_ation was instituted in the United States District C'OUrtf'Or the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The
plaintiffs, who are the appellees here, were the American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Pennsylvania
Section; certain physicians licensed in Pennsylvania; clergymen; an individual who purchases from a Pennsylvania insurer health-care and disability insurance extending to abortions; and Pennsylvania abortion counselors and providers.
Alleging that the Act violated the United States Constitution, the plaintiffs, pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1983, sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The defendants named in the
complaint were the Governor of the Commonwealth, other
Commonwealth officials, and the District Attorney for Montgomery County, Pa.
The plaintiffs promptly filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. Forty-one affidavits accompanied the motion.
The defendants, on their part, submitted what the Court of
Appeals described as "an equally comprehensive opposing
memorandum." 737 F. 2d 283, 289 (1984). The District
Court then ordered the parties to submit a "stipulation of uncontested facts," as authorized by local rule. The parties
produced a stipulation "solely for purposes of a determination
on plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction," and "without
prejudice to any party's right to controvert any facts or to
prove any additional facts at any later proceeding in this action." App. 9-10.

'
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Relying substantially on the opinions of the respective
Courts of Appeals in~kron Center for Reproductive Health,
Inc. v. City of Akron, 651 F. 2d 1198 (CA6 1981), later aff'd
in part and rev'd in part, 462 U. S. 416 (1983), and in
Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kansas City v. Ashcrgf_t, 655
F. 2d 848 (CA81981), later aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 462
U. S. 476 (1983), the District Court concluded that, with one
exce_ption, see n. 1, supra, t e plaintiffs had failed to-eshiblish a likelihood of success on the m~e not
entitleaTopreri~. 552 F-:--Supp--:- 791
(1982). --· - - --,.
Appellees appealed from the denial of the preliminary injunction, and appellants cross-appealed with respect to the
single statutory provision as to which the District Court had
allowed relief. The Third Circuit then granted appellees'
motion to enjoin enforcellieiit o the en 1re ct pendmg apf er expe 1 e
1e
n a gument, the court
pea .
withheld judgment pending the anticipated decisions by this
Court in '1f.kron, supra, 'lfihcroft, supra, and --8Imopoulos v.
Commonwealth, 221 Va. 1059, 277 S. E. 2d 194 (1981), all of
which had been accepted for review here, had been argued,
and were under submission. Those three cases were decided
by this__Qgjlrt on June 15, 1983. ~enter
for Reprod~-a:rth,Tric., 462 U.S. 416; Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462
U. S. 476; Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U. S. 506. After
reargument in light of those decisions, the QQurt of A_ppeals,
with one . judge~rt and dissenting in part,
ruled that various rovisions of the Act were unconstitutiona . 737 . 2 283 (1 8 .
ppel ants' pet1 10n for reheanng en bane was denied, with four judges voting to grant
the petition. !d., at 316, 317. When a jurisdictional statement was filed here, we ost oned further consideration of
the qu~tion to the hearmg on the merits.
-u.s.- (1985).
~

.:::"A 3

I

/'\~
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II

We are confronted initially with the question whether we
have appellate jurisdiction in this case. Appellants purport
to have taken their appeal to this Court pursuant to 28
U. S. C. § 1254(2). 4 It seems clear, and the parties appear
to agree, see Brief for Appellants 21, that the judgment of
the Court of Appeals was n~~nary
m~m. The court did not hold the entire Act
unconstitutional, but ruled, instead, that some provisions
were invalid under Akron, Ashcroft, and Simopoulos, and
that the validity of other provisions might depend on evidence adduced at the trial, see 737 F. 2d, at 299-300, or on
procedural rules to be promulgated by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, see id., at 296-297. It remanded these features of the case to the District Court. I d., at 304.
The early cases of Slaker v. O'Connor, 278 U. S. 188,
189-190 (1929), and McLish v. Roff, 141 U. S. 661, 665-666
(1891), suggest that under these circumstances we may not
have appellate jurisdiction. 5 See also South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. v. Flemming, 351 U. S. 901 (1956). Although
the authority of Slaker and South Carolina Electric has been
questioned, the Court has found it unnecessary to put the
issue to rest. See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U. S. 922,
927 (1975). In some cases raising this question of the scope
of appellate jurisdiction, the Court has found any finality requirement to have been satisfied in light of the facts. See,
e. g., New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U. S. 297, 302 (1976); Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 357 U. S. 77, 82-83
' Section 1254 reads in pertinent part:
"Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court
by the following methods:
"(2) By appeal by a party relying on a State statute held by a court of
appeals to be invalid as repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of
the United States . . . ."
5
Appellants ask that Slaker be overruled. See Brief for Appellants 10,
22-25.

~-~"'HA~ ~

d.........:.-=._:_:_~

?
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(1958). In other cases, the Court has avoided the issue by
utilizing 28 u_,_s.__c..__ § 2103 and granting certiorari. See,
e. g., Doran, 422 U.S., at 927; ~mons, 379
U. S. 497, 503 (1965); see also Escambia County v. McMillan, 466 U. S. 48, 50, n. 4 (1984).
In this case, too, in light of our doubts, we take the latter \
course. We therefore treat appellants' jurisdictional statement as a petition for certiorari, grant the writ, and move on
to the merits. 6
III
Appellants assert that the Court of Appeals erred in going
so far as to hold portions of the Act unconstitutional since the
scope of its review of the District Court's denial of a preliminary injunction as to those sections should be limited to
determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in
deciding that there were, or were riot, irreparable harin and
a probability that the plaintiff would succeed on the ·merits.
Such li ited review normally is a ro riate, see Doran v.
Salem Inn, nc., 4 U. ., at 931-932; Brown v. Choate, 411
U. S. 452, 456-457 (1973), inasmuch as the primar urpose
of a preliminary injunction is o preserve the relative positionSOftne pa es. See mvers yo exas v. Camenisch,
451 U.~1981). Further, the necessity for an expeditious resolution often means that the injunction is issued
on a procedure less stringent than that which prevails at the
subsequent trial on the merits of the application for injunctive relief. See United States Steel Corp. v. Fraternal
Assn. of Steelhaulers, 431 F. 2d 1046, 1048 (CA3 1970); see
also Mayo .v. Lakeland Highlands Canning Co., 309 U. S.
310, 316 (1940).
This approach, however, is not inflexible. The Court on
more than one occasion in this area has approved proceedings
deviating from the stated norm. In Youngstown Sheet &
6
We continue, however, to refer to the parties as appellants and appellees, respectively.
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Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952), the District Court
had issued a preliminary injunction restraining the Secretary
of Commerce from seizing the Nation's steel mills. The
Court of Appeals stayed the injunction. This Court found
that the case was ripe for review, despite the early stage of
the litigation, and went on to address the merits. I d., at
585. And in Smith v. Vulcan Iron Works, 165 U. S. 518
(1897), the District Court issued injunctions in two patent
cases and referred them to a Master for accounting. The
Court of Appeals reversed. This Court ruled that the Court
of Appeals had acted properly in deciding the merits since review of interlocutory appeals was designed not only to permit
the defendant to obtain immediate relief but also in certain
cases to save the parties the expense of further litigation.
Id., at 525.
The Third Circuit's decision to address the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania Act finds further support in this
Court's decisions that when the unconstitutionality of particular state action that is challenged is clear, a federal court
need not abstain from addressing the constitutional issue
pending state-court review. See, e. g., Bailey v. Patterson,
396 U. S. 31, 33 (1962); Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U. S.
350, 353 (1962); Zwickler v. Koota, 398 U. S. 241, 251, n. 14.
See also Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106, 121 (1976). See
generally Spann, Simple Justice, 73 Geo. L. J. 1041, 1055,
n. 77 (1985). 7
T@s, as these cases indicate, if a District Court's ruling
rest§ sole ~s to the aj)Ifcable rule of law, and
the f~hed oro no controlling relevance, that
_.,
7

This principle finds an analogy in an established doctrine of administrative law. In SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80 (1943), the Court
ruled that a reviewing court could not affirm an agency on a principle the
agency might not embrace. But the ruling in Chenery has not required
courts to remand in futility. See Illinois v. ICC, 722 F. 2d 1341,
1348-1349 (CA7 1983); see also Friendly, Chenery Revisited, Reflections
on Reversal and Remand of Administrative Orders, 1969 Duke L. J. 199.
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ruling may be reviewed even though the appeal is from the
entry of a preliminary injunction. 8 The Court of Appeals in
this case properly recognized and applied these principles
when it observed:
"Thus, although this appeal arises from a ruling on a request for a preliminary injunction, we have befo@J!.&_.an
unusual! complete factual and le arpreseiifation from
whic to address the im orta t constitutional issues at
st
lie customary discretion accorded to a District
Court's ruling on a preliminary injunction yields to our
plenary scope of review as to the applicable law." 737
F. 2d, at 290.
That a court of appeals ordinarily will limit its review in a
case of this kind to abuse of discretion is a rule of orderly judicial administration, not a limit on judicial power. With a
full record before it on the issues now before us, and with the
intervening decisions in Akron, Ashcroft, and Simopoulos at
hand, the Court of Appeals was justified in proceeding to plenary review of those issues ..
IV
This case, as it comes to us, concerns the constitutionality
of six r>rovisio.ns of the Pennsylvania Act which the ourt of
Appeals struck down as facially invalid: § 3205 informed
8
A different situation is presented, of course, when there is no disagreement as to the law, but the probability of success on the merits depends on facts that are likely to emerge at trial. See Delaware & H. R.
Co. v. United Transportation Union, 146 U. S.App.D. C. 142, 159, 450 F.
2d 603, 620, cert. denied, 403 U. S. 911 (1971).
See also Airco, Inc. v. Energy Research & Development Admin., 528 F.
2d 1294, 1296 (CA7 1975); California ex rel . Younger v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency, 516 F . 2d 215, 217 (CA9), cert. denied, 423 U. S. 868
(1975); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 148
U. S.App.D. C. 5, 10, 458 F. 2d 827, 832 (1972); Benda v. Grand Lodge,
584 F. 2d 308, 314 (CA9 1978), cert. dism'd, 441 U. S. 937 (1979); FTC v.
Southwest Sunsites, Inc., 665 F. 2d 711, 717 (CA5), cert. denied, 456 U. S.
973 (1982).

j
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consent"); § 3208 ~rinted informati9Jl"); §§ 3214(a) and (h)
/ (reporting requirements); § 3211(a) '{determination of viability); § 3210(b) f<fegree oj care required in postviability abortions); and § 3210(c) '{second-physician requirement). We
have no reason to address the validity of the other sections of
the Act challenged in the District Court. 9
No~e: § 3209 (requirement of hospitalization for an abortion suosequent to the first trimester) and § 3205 (24-hour waiting period
and physician-only counseling-evidently reserved for further litigation);
§ 3215(e) (compulsory availability of insurance excluding certain abortion
services-ruled unconstitutional by the Court of Appeals); §§ 3207(b) and
3214(f) (public disclosure of reports-being the subject of a hearing on a
renewed motion for injunctive relief); and § 3215(c) (proscription of use of
public funds for abortion services-being the subject of a separate statecourt action and partially enjoined, see Fischer v. Department of Public
Welfare, 85 Pa. Commw. 215, 239-240, 482 A. ~d 1137, 1148 (1984), appeal
pending, 67 M.D. App. Docket (Pa. S. Ct.)).
Also npt before us currently are: § 3203 (definition of "abortion"), and
§ 3210(!1) (penalties for abortion after viability, and the "complete defense"
thereto).
Remanded for record development or otherwise not invalidated are:
§ 3206 (parental consent-operation of statute enjoined until promulgation
of rules by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania assuring confidentiality and
promptness of disposition); § 3207(b) (abortion facilities and reports from
them for public disclosure); and §§ 3214(c), (d), (f), and (g) (other reporting
requirements-challenges either not made or withdrawn).
On June 17, 1985, the District Court, after hearing, preliminarily enjoined the enforcement of§§ 3207(b) and 3214(:f). Civil Action No. 82-4336
(ED Pa.). See n. 12, infra.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued the suggested rules, mentioned above, on November 26, 1984, after the appeal in this case was
docketed here. See Pennsylvania Orphan's Court Rules 16.1 to 16.8, reprinted in 20 Pa. Cons. Stat. following § 794 (Supp. 1985). Appellants
thereupon filed a motion with the District Court that the injunction against
enforcement of§ 3206 be vacated. App. 53. That court, however, denied
the motion, concluding that it had no jurisdiction "to issue the order [appellants] seek" while the case was on appeal here. I d., at 57, 61. We decline
appellants' suggestion that we now examine this feature of the case in the
light of the new rules, for we conclude that this development should be considered by the District Court in the first instance when it concludes that it
has jurisdiction to do so after our decision today.
9
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Less than three years ago, this Court in Akron, Ashcroft,
and Simopoulos, reviewed challenges to state and municipal
legislation regulating the performance of abortions. In Akron, the Court specifically reaffirmed Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S.
111 (1973). See 462 U. S., at420, 426-431. Again today, as
noted infra, we reaffirm the general rinci les laid down in
Roe and in Akron.
In the years since this Court's decision in Roe, States and
municipalities have adopted a number of measures seemingly
designed to prevent a woman, with her physician, from exercising her freedom of choice. Akron is but one example.
But the constitutional rinci le_s that led this Court to its decisions in 73 st~he compelling reason for reco~izin the constitutional dimeiiSiO'iiSOfaWoman sri ht, together wi_Ql~i~an, to decide whether to end_ her
pr~. - ''[I]t shoUld go withoUts eyingthatthev itality
of these constitutional principles cannot be allowed to yield
simply because of disagreement wjth them." Brown v.
Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294, 300 (1955). The States
are not free, under the guise of protecting maternal health or
potential life, to !!!_ti~te women into continuing pregnancies. Appellants claim that the statutory provisions before
us today further legitimate compelling interests of the Commonwealth. Close analysis of those provisions, however,
shows that they wh0lry8u5or mate constitutional privacy int~a -~na con erns witli maternal health to the effort to
deter a woman from making a decision that, with her physician_J§~ke.
--- - We turn to the challenged statutes:
1. Section 3205 ("informed consent") and § 3208 (printed
information). Section 3205(a) requires that the woman give
her "voluntary and informed consent" to an abortion. Failure to observe the provisions of § 3205 subjects the physician
to suspension or revocation of his license, and subjects any
other person obligated to provide information relating to in-

---------------
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formed consent to criminal penalties. § 3205(c). A require- ,
ment that the woman give what is truly a voluntary and informed consent, as a general proposition, is, of course,
proper and surely is not unconstitutional. See Danforth, 428
U. S., at 67. But the State may not require the delivery of
inf~d "to influence the woman's informed
c~oi~e between abo@n or cblfui}irth." A]Eyn, 462 U. S., at
443-444. Appellants refer to the Akron ordinance, Brief for
Appellants 67,asdid this Court in Akron itself, 462 U. S., at
445, as "a litany of information" and as "a parade of horribles"
of dubious validity plainly des!_gne_9 to influence the woman's
choice. They wouldaiSfiilgUisnt~ow
eW, from the Pennsylvania one. Appellants assert that
statutes "describing the general subject matter relevant to
informed consent," ibid., and stating "in general terms the
information to be disclosed," id., at 447, are permissible, and
· they further assert that the Pennsylvania statutes do no
more than that.
We do not agree. We conclude that, like Akron's ordinance, §§ 3205 and 3208 'fa1l tlie A'fron measurement. The
the method for securing "intwosections prescribe in
formed consent." Se~nds of information must
be delivered to the woman a!_~~.L24_bours before her consent is given, and five of these must bvresented by the
woman's physician. The five are: (a) the name of the physician who will perform the abortion, (b) the "fact that there
ma~e det~~~~~<!.psychological effects which
are notaccurately foreseeable," (c) the "particular medical
risks associated with the particular abortion procedure to be
employed," (d) the probable gestational age, and (e) the
"medical risks associated with carrying ·her child to term."
The remaining two categories are (f) the "fact that medical
assistance -~s m~ be available for prenatal care; -§_ldbirtnananeonatal care," and (g) the "fact that the father is
liab-re-to assist" in the child's support, "even in instances 77
where the father has offered to pay for the abortion."

mr
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§§ 3205(a)(l) and (2). She also must be informed that materials printed and supplied by the Commonwealth that describe
the fetus and that list agencies offering alternatives to abortion, are available for her review. If she chooses to review
the materials but is unable to read, the materials "shall be
read to her," and any answer she seeks must be "provided
her in her own language." § 3205(a)(2)(iii). She m~
tifyJ!.L_w.ri.ting, prior to ~rtion, that ~ll this_b.as peen
done. § 3205(a)(3). The printed materials "shall include the
fOllowing statement":

"There are many public and private agencies willing
and able to help you to carry your child to term, and to
assist you and your child after your child is born,
whether you choose to keep your child or place her or
him for adoption. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
strongly urges you to contact them before making a final
decision about abortion. The law requires that your
physician or his agent give you the opportunity to call
agencies like these before you undergo an abortion."
§ 3208(a)(l).
The materials must describe the "probable anatomical and
physiological characteristics of'the unborn child at two-week
gestational increments from fertilization to full term, including any relevant information on the possibility of the unborn
child's survival." § 3208(a)(2).
In AkronL this Court noted: "The validity of an informed
consent requirement thus rests on the State's interest in protecting the health of the pregnant woman." 462 U. S., at
443. The Court went on to state:
"This does not mean, however, that a State has unreviewable authority to decide what information a
woman must be given before she chooses to have an
abortion. It remains primarily the responsibility of the
physician to ensure that appropriate information is conveyed to his patient, depending on her particular circum-
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stances. Danforth's recognition of the State's interest
in ensuring that this information be given will not justify
abortion re 1 ti s esi ed to influence the woman's
informed choice between abortion or c i b1rth." d., at
44~

The informational requirements in the Akron ordinance
were invalid for two "equally decisive" reasons. I d., at 445.
The first was that "much of the information required is desi~ed not to inform the woman's consent but rather to J2ersuade her to withhold it alto ether." I d., at 444. The secon was rna a rigid requirement that a specific body of
information be given in all cases, irrespective of the particular needs of the patient, intrudes upon the discretion of the
pregnant woman's physician and thereby imposes the "'undesired and uncomfortable straitjacket'" with which the Court
in Danforth, 428 U. S., at 67, n. 8, was concerned.
These two reasons apply with equal and controlling force to
the specific and intrusive informational prescriptions of the
Pennsylvania statutes. The printed materials required by
§§ 3205 and 3208 seem to us to be nothing less than an outright attempt to wedge the Commonwealth's message discouraging abortion into the privacy of the informed-consent
dialogue between the woman and her physician. The mandated description of fetal characteristics at 2-week intervals,
no matter how objective, is plainly overinclusive. This is not
medical information that is always relevant to the woman's
decision, and it may serve only to confuse and punish her and
to heighten her anxiety, contrary to accepted medical practice. 10 Even the listing of agencies in the printed Pennsylva-

'° Following this Court's lead in Akron, federal courts consistently have )
stricken fetal-description requirements because of their inflammatory impact. See, e. g., Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts v. Bellotti, 641 F. 2d 1006, 1021-1022 (CAl 1981); Charles v. Carey, 627 F . 2d
772, 784 (CA7 1980); Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kansas City v. Ashcroft, 655 F . 2d 848, 868 (CA8 1981); Women's Medical Center of Providence, Inc. v. Roberts, 530 F. Supp. 1136, 1152-1154 (RI 1982).
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nia form presents serious problems; it contains names of
agencies that well may be out of step with the needs of the
particular woman and thus places the physician in an awkward position and infringes upon his or her professional
responsibilities. Forcing the physician or counselor to
present the materials and the list to the woman makes him or
her in effect an agent of the State in treating the woman and
places his or her imprimatur upon both the materials and the
list. See Women's Medical Center of Providence, Inc. v.
Roberts, 530 F. Supp. 1136, 1154 (RI 1982). All this is, or
comes close to being, state medicine imposed upon the
wo~essionarmecncal idance she seeks, and
itOfficially s ructures-as it obviously was mtended to dothe dialogue between the woman and her physician.
The requirements of§§ 3205(a)(2)(i) and (ii) that the woman
be advised of the possible availability of medical assistance
benefits, and that the father is responsible for financial assistance in the support of the child similarly are po~lz disguised elements of discotira ement for the abortion ecision.
Mucn of this wou
e nonmedica information beyon the
physician's area of expertise and, for man a · s, would
be irre evant ~opnate. For a patient with a lifethreatenmgpregnancy, the "information" in its very rendition may be cruel as well as destructive of the physician-patient relationship. As any experienced social worker or
other counsellor knows, theoretical financial responsibility
often does not e uate with 'fulfillment. And a victim of rape
shou d not have to hear gratuitous advice that an unidentified
perpetrator is liable for support if she continues the pregnancy to term. Under the guise of informed consent, the
Act requires the dissemination of information that is not relevant to such consent, and, thus, it advances no legitimate
state interest.
The requirements of §§ 3205(a)(l)(ii) and (iii) that the
woman be informed by the physician of "·detrimental physical
and psychological effects" and of all "particular medical risks"

5

~
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compound the problem of medical attendance, increase the
patient's anxiety, and intrude upon the physician's exercise of
proper professional judgment. This type of compelled information is the antithesis of informed consent. That the
Commonwealth does not, and surely would not, compel similar disclosure of every possible peril of necessary surgery or
of simple vaccination, reveals the anti-abortion character of
the statute and its real purpose. · Pennsylvania, like Akron,
"has gone far beyond merely describing the general subject
matter relevant to informed consent." Akron, 462 U. S., at
445. In addition, the Commonwealth would require the physician to recite its litany "regardless of whether in his judgment the information is relevant to [the patient's] personal
decision." Ibid. These statutory defects cannot be saved
by any facts that might be forthcoming at a subsequent hearing. Section 3205's informational requiremeJ?.ts therefore
are facially unconstitutional. 11
Appellants assert, however, that even if this be so, the
remedy is to allow the remainder of the statute to be severed
and become effective. We rule otherwise. The radical dissection necessary for this would leave the statute with little
resemblance to that intended by the Pennsylvania Legislature. We rejected a similar suggestion as to the ordinance in
Akron, 462 U.S, at 445, n. 37, despite the presence there of a
broad severability clause. We reach the same conclusion
here, where no such clause is present, and reject the plea for
In their argument against this conclusion, appellants claim that the
informational requirements must be held constitutional in the light of this
Court's summary affirmance in Franklin v. Fitzpatrick, 428 U. S. 901
(1976), of the judgment in Planned Parenthood Assn. v. Fitzpatrick, 401
F. Supp. 554 (ED Pa. 1975). That litigation concerned the Commonwealth's 1974 Abortion Control Act. Its informed-consent provision, however, did not contain such plainly unconstitutional informational requests
as those in the current Act, or any physician-only counseling or 24-hour
waiting-period requirements. The summary affirmance also preceded the
decision in Akron and, to the extent, if any at all, it might be considered to
be inconsistent with Akron, the latter, of course, controls.
11
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severance. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238,
312-313 (1936).
2. Sections 3214(a) and (h) (reporting) and § 3211(a) (determi~tion ~214(a)(8), part of the general
reporting section, incorporates § 3211(a). Section 3211(a) requires the physician to report the basis for his determination
"that a child1Si10fVlable." It a_E£,lies oruy: aftei.:The first t rime~ required by §§ 3214(a) and (h) is detailed
;mcrmust include, among other thing(1identification of the
performing and referring physicians and of the facility or
agency;Anif~ation as to the woman's p~cal s~ivision
and St~~idence,1:~e, marit~tus, atnfnumber
of prio regnancies; th~te ~r last menstrual period
an t
ro a e gestational age;rhe ~s for any judgment
that a medical emergency exi~ th't-l)asis for any determination of nonviability; and t~ethod of payment for the
abortion. The report is to be signed by the attending physician. § 3214(b). · Despite the fact that § 3214(e)(2) provides
that such reports "shallllofl)e deemed public records,"
with~ing of the Commonwealth's "Right-to-Know
Law," Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 65, § 66.1 et seq. (Purdon 1959 and
Supp. 1985), e~ch report "shall be made available for £Ublic
inspection and copying with1nl5 days of receipt in a form
whiCli Will nofre aa to tlledisclosure of the identity of any person filing a report." Similarly, the report of complications,
required by § 3214(h), "shall be open to public inspection and
copying." A willful failure to file a report required under
§ 3214 is "unprofessional conduct" and the noncomplying physician's license "shall be subject to suspension or revocation."
§ 3214(i)(1).
In Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. ~forthl 428
U. S. 52, 80 (1976), we recognized that recordkeeping andreporting provisions "that are reasonably directed to the preservation of maternal health and that properly respect a patient's confidentiality and privacy are permissible." But the
reports required under the Act before us today go well be-
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yond the health-related interests that served to justify the
Missouri reports under consideration in Danforth. Pennsylvania would require, a~ Missouri ~t, information as to
method of payment, as to the woman's personal history, and
as to the bases for medical judgments. The Missouri rEmorts
were to be used "only for statistical purposes." See id., at
87. 'I'hey were to be maintained in confidence, with the sole
exception of pubhc hea1th0fncers. In Akron, the Court explained its holding in Danforth when it said: "The decisive
factor was that the State met its burden of demonstrating
that these regulations furthered important health-related
state concerns." 462 U. S., at 430.
The required Pennsylvania reports, on the other hand,
while claimed not to be "public," are available nonetheless to
the public for copying. Moreover, there is no limitation on
the use to which the Commonwealth or the public copiers
may put them. The elements that proved persuasive Jor the
ruling in Danforth are absent here. The decision to terminate a ~ely private one that must be
protected in a way that assures anonymity. JUSTICE STEVENS, in his opinion concurring in the judgment in Bellotti v.
B~, 443 U. S. 622 (1979), aptly observed:
"It is inherent in the right to make the abortion decision
that the right may be exercised witqout E_ublic scrutiny
and in defiance of the contrary opinion of the sovereign
or other third parties." I d ., at 655.
The scope of the information required and its availability to
the public belie any assertions by the Commonwealth that it
is advancing any legitimate interest. A woman and her physician will necessarily be more reluctant to choose an abortion
if there exists a possibility that her decision and her identity
will become known publicly. Although the statute does not
specifically require the reporting of the woman's name, the
amount of information about her and the circumstances under
which she had an abortion are so detailed that identification is
likely. Identification is the obvious purpose of these ex-

i
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treme reporting requirements. 12 The "impermissible limits"
that Danforth mentioned, see 428 U. S., at 81, and that Missouri approached have been exceeded here.
We note, as we reach this conclusion, that the Court consistently has refused to allow government to chill the exercise of constitutional rights by requiring disclosure of protected, but sometimes unpopular, activities. See, e. g .,
Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U. S. 301 (1965) (invalidating Post Office requirement that addressee affirmatively
request delivery of "communist" materials in order to receive
them); Talley v. California, 362 U. S. 60, 64-65 (1960) (striking down municipal ban on unsigned handbills); NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449, 462-465 (1958) (invalidating compelled disclosure of NAACP membership list).
Pe:Rnsylvania's reporting requirements raise the spectre of
public exposure and harassment of women who choose to exercise t e1r personal, intensely private, right, with their physician, to end a pregnancy. Thus, they pose an unacceptable
danger of deterring the exercise of that right, and must be
invalidated.
3. Section 3210(b) (degree of care for postviability abor~iQnS.)., and §32~~ls1~~ir~
Appellees advise us , see Brief for Appellees 38-39, that they sought in
the DiStriCt Court a preliminary injunction against the re uirenleiitthat
the facility identificatiOn rEll?O an
e quarterly statistic~ report be
made availa
ubrc i ection and co ymg, and that on June 17, 1985,
after full hearing, the District Court entered a prehmmary injunction
agafriSttFieenfor mentoT1ne8eoUl:illC-msCICisurerequirements. Appellees assert that the record of that hearing s ows a continuous pattern of
violence and harassment directed against the patients and staff of abortion
clinics; that the District Court concluded that this would be increased by
the public disclosure of facility names and quarterly statistical reports; and
that public disclosure would impose a burden on the woman's right to an
abortion by heightening her fear and anxiety, and by discouraging her physician from offering an abortion because, by so doing, he would avoid pressure from anti-abortion forces . That record, of course, is not now before
us. We need place no reliance upon it and we draw no conclusion from it.
12

l
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fet~viable).

Section 3210(b) 13 sets forth B:Yo iD:dependent reqmrements for a ostv1a ility abo wn ~irst,
it demands the exercise of that degree o care "which such
person would be required to exercise in order to preserve the
life and health of any unborn child intended to be born and
not aborted." Second, "the abortion technique employed
shall be that which would provide the best opportunity for
the unborn child to be aborted alive unless," in the physician's good-faith judgment, that technique "would present a
significantly greater medical risk to the life or health of the
pregnant woman." An intentional, knowing, or reckless violation of this standard is a felony of the third degree, and
subjects the violator to the possibility of imprisonment for
not more than seven years and to a fine of not more than
$15,000. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 1101(2) and 1103(3)
(1983).
The Court of Appeals ruled that § 3210(b) was unconstitu- C: /-1 ;,
tional because it re uired a "trade-off" between the woman's
health and fetal surviVa , and failed to require that maternal
health be the p'&sician•s aramount co si er ion . --rr37 F.
2d, at 300, citing Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379,
397-401 (1979) (where Pennsylvania's 1974 Abortion Control
Act was reviewed). In Colautti, this Court recognized the
13
Section 3210(b) reads:
"Every person who performs or induces an abortion after an unborn
child has been determined to be viable shall exercise that degree of professional skill, care and diligence which such person would be required to exercise in order to preserve the life and health of any unborn child intended
to be born and not aborted and the abortion technique employed shall be
that which would provide the best opportunity for the unborn child to be
aborted alive unless, in the good faith judgment of the physician, that
method or technique would present a significantly greater medical risk to
the life or health of the pregnant woman than would another available
method or technique and the physician reports the basis for his judgment.
The potential psychological or emotional impact on the mother of the unborn child's survival shall not be deemed a medical risk to the mother.
Any person who intentionally, knowingly or recklessly violates the provisions of this subsection commits a felony of the third degree."
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undesir ilit of an "'trade-off' between the woman's health
and additional percentage pomts of fetal survival." I d., at
400.
Appellants do not take any real issue with this proposition.
See Brief for Appellants 84-86. They argue instead, as did
the District Court, see 552 F. Supp., at 806-807, that the
statute's words "significantly greater medical risk" for the
life or health of the woman do not mean some additional risk
(in which case unconstitutionality apparently is conceded) but
only a "meaningfully increased" risk. That interpretation,
said the District Court, renders the statute constitutional.
Id., at 807. The~greed, point!_~ out
that such a readin IS mcon~wit the~~y langua e an WI h t e egislative inten1.J:_~flected in that language; that the adverb "significantly" modifies the risk
imposed on the woman; that the adverb is "patently not surplusage"; and that the language of the statute "is not susceptible to a construction that does not require the mother to
bear an increased medical risk in order to save her viable
fetus." 737 F. 2d, at 300. We agree with the Court of Appeals and therefore find the sta~valid. 14
Sec wn
10 c
r mres t at a secon p ysician be
present during an abortion performed when viability is possible. The second physician is to "take control of the child and

-

This makes it unnecessary for us to consider appellees' further argument that § 3210(b) is void for vagueness.
15
Section 3210(c) reads:
"Any person who intends to perform an abortion the method chosen for
which , in his good faith judgment, does not preclude the possibility of the
child surviving the abortion, shall arrange for the attendance, in the same
room in which the abortion is to be completed, of a second physician. Immediately after the complete expulsion or extraction of the child, the second physician shall take control of the child and shall provide immediate
medical care for the child, taking all reasonable steps necessary, in his
judgment, to preserve the child's life and health. Any person who intentionally, knowingly or recklessly violates the provisions of this subsection
commits a felony of the third degree."
14
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... provide immediate medical care for the child, taking all
reasonable steps necessary, in his judgment, to preserve the
child's life and health." Violation of this requirement is a felony of the third degree.
In Planned Parenthood Assn. v. ~' 462 U.S. 476
~the Court, by a 5-4 vote, b~_§in
~on, ruled that a Missouri statute requirin the resence of a secon physician uring an abortion erformed after
via£~.
USTICE POWEL_h joined by
THE-cHIEF JUSTICE, co~te had_a com..Pellin interest in rotecting the life of a viable fetus al}Q.Jhat
the second
'cian's resence provided assurance tha the
Stat~ interest was protecte more ftillYJh_an wit!l onl:;: one
physician in attendance. I d., at 482-486. 16 JusTICE PowELL ~hat, to pass constitutional muster, the statute must containan exce tion for the situation where the
heath of the mother was ~dan~ere y e ay in the arrival
of tlle secOriCf'i)hYsician. Recognizing that there was "no
clearly expressed exception" on the face of the Missouri statute for the emergency situation, JusTICE PowELL found the
exception implicit in the statutory requirement that action be
taken to preserve the fetus "provided it does not pose an increased risk to the life or health of the woman." !d., at 485,
n. 8.
Like the Missouri statute, § 3210(c) of the Pennsylvania
statute contains no express exception for an emergency situation. While the Missouri statute, in the view of JUSTICE
POWELL, w~ently tQ...imRl;y- an emergency ex~RtiEn, Pennsylvan1a's statute contains no such comforting
or helpful language ana evinces no intent to protect a woman
w~ay be at risk. Section 3210(a) 17 provides only a
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, joined by JUSTICES WHITE and REHNQUIST,
stated somewhat cate orically that the second- hysician requirement was
constitutional. 462 U. . , a 05.
7
' Section 3210(a) reads:
'

6
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defense to criminal liability for a physician who concluded, in
good faith, that a fetus was nonviable "or that the abortion
was necessary to preserve maternal life or health." It does
not relate to the second-physician requirement and its words
are not words of emergency.
It is clear that the Pennsylvania Legislature knows how to
provide a medical-emer enc e c tion when it chooses to do
so. It defined " m edical emergency" in general terms in
§ 3203, and it specifically provided a medical-emergency exception with respect to informational requirements, § 3205(b);
for parental consent, § 3206; for post-first trimester hospitalization, § 3209; and for a public official's issuance of an order
for an abortion without the express voluntary consent of the
woman, § 3215(f). We necessarily conclude that the legislature's failure to rovi~~tion in
§ 3210(c) was in~l. All the factors are here for chilling
the performance of a late abortion, which, more than one performed at an earlier date, perhaps tends to be under emer.gency conditions.

v

Although appellants challenge the merits of the Third Circuit's decision solely on the ground that the Court of Appeals
misapplied Roe v. Wade and its successors, the Solicitor General, appearing on behalf of the United States as amicus curiae in support of appellants, urges that we take this occasion
to overrule those cases entirely. For the Solicitor General
to ask us to discard a line of major constitutional rulings in a
case where no party has made a similar request is, to say the
least, unusual. We decline his invitation.
"Any person who intentionally, knowingly or recklessly performs or induces an abortion when the fetus is viable commits a felony of the third
degree. It shall be a complete defense to any charge brought against a
physician for violating the requirements of this section that he had concluded in good faith, in his best medical judgment, that the unborn child
was not viable at the time the abortion was performed or induced or that
the abortion was necessary to preserve maternal life or health."
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We concluded in Akron that there are "especially compelling reasons" for adhering to the principles of Roe:
"That case was considered with special care. It was
first argued during the 1971 Term, and reargued-with
extensive briefing-the following Term. The decision
was joined by THE CHIEF JusTICE and six other Justices. Since Roe was decided in January 1973, the
Court repeatedly and consistently has accepted and applied the basic principle that a woman has a fundamental
right to make a highly personal choice whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy" (citing cases). 462 U. S., at
420, n. 1.
The Solicitor General notes that our holding in Roe has required courts to draw difficult lines. With this observation
we agree, although it does not lead us to the Solicitor General's conclusion. Constitutional rights do not always have
easily ascertainable boundaries, and controversy over the
meaning of our Nation's most majestic guarantees frequently
.
has been turbulent. As judges, however, we are sworn to
..,.._. • .J...
uphold the law even when its content gives rise t~ ~~
pute. WerecognizedinRoe, 410U. S., at 116~esub- 1~·
ject of abortion raises moral and spiritual questions over
which honorable persons can disagree sincerely and profoundly. But those disagreements did not then and do not
now relieve us of our duty to apply the Constitution faithfully. We held in Roe, and we reaffirm today, that a woman's decision, made with her physician, whether t9f!91Itina:e
~
her pregnancy is among those decisions so personal and so intimate that th~y may be regulated only as strictly necessary
to protect compelling state interests.
Our cases long have recognized that the Constitution embodies a substantive promise that a certain private sphere of
individual liberty will be kept largely beyond the reach of
government. See, e. g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438
(1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965); Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923). That promise extends to
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all persons, women as well as men. Few decisions are more
personal, more properly private, or more basic to individual
dignity and autonomy, than a woman's decision, with the
guidance of her physician, whether to end her pregnancy. A
woman's right to make such a choice freely is fundamental.
Any other result, in our view r would protect inadequately a
central part of the sphere of liberty that our law guarantees
equally to all.
The Court of Appeals correctly invalidated the specified
provisions of Pennsylvania's 1982 Abortion Control Act. Its
judgment is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
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Sincerely,

Justice Blackmun

Copies to the Conference

.inprtttU Qfanrl of tlft ~tb .itaftg
jirufringhm. ~. (!f. 21lp~~
CHAMBER S OF

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

April 14, 1986

Re:

84-495 - Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstretricians

Dear Byron:
Please rejoin me in your dissent.
Sincerely,

Justice White
cc:

The Conference

.inprttttt Qf111lrlltf t!rt ~tb .Stzdtg

._asftinghm. ~. <If. 2.0bi~~
C HAMB E R S OF"

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

May 7, 1986
Re:

No. 84-495

Thornburgh v. Am. College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists

Dear Sandra,
Please join me in your dissent in this case.
Sincerely,

~

Justice O'Connor
cc:

The Conference
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CHAMBE:RS OF

..JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

June 24, 1986

Dear Bill, Thurgood, and Lewis,
One of our Atlanta daughters sent me this cartoon
from the Atlanta Journal.
I thought it might amuse you,
as it did me.
Sincerely,

-

Justice Brennan
Justice Marshall
Justice Powell
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